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ABSTRACT
A failure modes and consequence analysis of fusion magnet system is an
important contributor towards enhancing the design by improving the reliability
and reducing the risk associated with the operation of magnet systems. In the
first part of this study, a failure mode analysis of a superconductin magnet
system is performed. Building on the functional breakdown and the fault tree
analysis of the Toroidal Field (TF) coils of the Next European Torus (NET),
several subsystem levels are added and an overview of potential sources of
failures in a manet system is provided. The failure analysis is extended to the
Poloidal Field PF) magnet system. Furthermore, an extensive analysis of
interactions within the fusion device caused by the operation of the PF magnets
is presented in the form of an Interaction Matrix. A number of these
interactions may have significant consequences for the TF magnet system
particularly interactions triggered by electrical failures in the PF magnet system.
In the second part of this study, two basic categories of electrical failures in the
PF magnet system are examined: short circuits between the terminals of
external PF coils, and faults with a constant voltage applied at external PF coil
terminals. An electromagnetic model of the Compact Ignition Tokamak (CIT) is
used to examine the mechanical load conditions for the PF and the TF coils
resulting from these fault scenarios. It is found that shorts do not pose large
threats to the PF coils. Also, the type of plasma disruption has little impact
on the net forces on the PF and the TF coils. But the out-of-plane loads at
the inner corners of the TF coils can increase substantially for a wide range of
scenarios, and the magnitude of these loads depends highly on the terminal
constraints on the internal PF coils.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Fusion Magnet Systems
Fusion is currently one of the largest worldwide research efforts which aim
at developing new energy sources for the future. Mainly four groups of countries
are supporting fusion research at the present time, namely Japan, the Soviet
Union, Western Europe and the United States. The amount of money being
spent on research in fusion technology and engineering is large and has recently
been between 300 to 600 million dollars per year in each of these groups of
countries.
There are two basic approaches to controlled fusion energy that are being
pursued at the present time: inertial confinement fusion and magnetic
confinement fusion. In general, in order to make a fusion reaction work and
produce a self maintained reaction for a certain period of time, it is required to
confine the fusion fuel for a sufficiently long period of time at high particle
density and temperature. Inertial confinement fusion approaches these necessary
conditions by compression of solid fusion fuel for a sufficiently long time. For
instance, one method employs lasers with high power density which are focused
on a fuel pellet. When the pellet is heated up fast enough, i.e. high particle
density and temperature are achieved simultaneously, fusion reactions can be
initiated and self maintained until the reactive forces in the pellet overcome the
inertial forces and the pellet is torn apart.
The magnetic confinement concept uses magnetic fields to confine a plasma,
which is an ionized gas of fusion fuel, in a reaction vessel. The plasma is
obtained by heating the fusion fuel by induced currents, electromagnetic waves or
injection of fast neutral particles, for instance. In order to achieve high plasma
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densities, it is required to confine the plasma by strong magnetic fields. Again,
confinement time and plasma temperature must be high enough to allow for
fusion reactions and a positive net output of energy.
This study addresses some aspects of the magnetic confinement fusion
approach. Within this approach, there are again several different concepts. The
problem is clearly to achieve high temperature (leading to high particle
velocities) and long confinement times at the same time.
Magnetic confinement is based on the physical principle that electrically
charged particles tend to follow magnetic field lines. These field lines act like a
guiding center, around which the charged particles may gyrate. Therefore, there
are several different ideas for fusion reactors with magnetic confinement, such as
mirror machines or tokamak devices. In mirror machines, the plasma is confined
in a magnetic bottle, where particles are reflected back into the bottle by strong
magnetic fields at its ends. However, for reasons of large losses of particles and
energy, and confinement stability considerations, systems with closed magnetic
field lines such as tokamaks are favored at the present time. In a tokamak,
ring shaped closed magnetic field lines are produced by toroidal coils.
Assuming a constant magnetic field Bt along a toroidal line of radius R, the
total electrical current NIt within an area of radius R is given by
27r
f BtRdO = pkNIt (1.1)
0
where 0 is the toroidal angle. Performing the integration in Eq. 1.1 then yields
Bt = 110N .(1.2)
Neglecting field ripple effects, this toroidal field Bt could then be produced by a
number of N TF coils, each carrying a current of magnitude It, as illustrated in
Fig. 1-1. Eq. 1.2 also shows, that when the magnetic field is purely toroidal, it
scales inversely to the radius R, since
Bt(R)R = Bt(r)r = constant . (1.3)
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This effect leads to a field gradient that, together with centrifugal effects which
are caused by particles following a toroidal magnetic field line, will cause a drift
of these particles in a direction perpendicular to the (usually horizontal) plane of
the guiding center. However, particles of different charge will drift in opposite
directions, causing an electrical field in the vertical direction to develop. This
electrical field will cause another particle drift, and both drifts combine to drive
the plasma towards a larger radius (i.e., the outside wall of the vacuum vessel).
In order to counteract these drifts, helical guiding magnetic field lines are
used so that the particles will move as often towards the midplane as away from
it on average. Such helical magnetic field lines can be obtained by adding a
magnetic field Bp of circular type around the toroidal magnetic field lines, i.e.,
in the minor (poloidal) cross section of the torus with major (toroidal) radius R.
In the tokamak concept, this magnetic field Bp is produced by a ring
current Ip which is carried by the plasma itself. This plasma current I, is
induced by a unidirectional change of magnetic flux, where the plasma acts like
the second winding of a transformer coil, and the primary winding is made up of
solenoidal ring coils concentric to the torus, as illustrated in Fig. 1-1.
Since such a unidirectional flux change can only be maintained for a finite
time, these coils need to be operated in a pulsed mode. Also, due to the
cylindrical symmetry of the field lines, the magnetic field Bp will be stronger on
the inside than on the outside of the torus. An additional magnetic field in the
vertical direction is therefore needed to correct those differences and allow for
radial equilibrium, and it can be generated by solenoidal ring coils as well.
There is an additional important effect of the plasma current Ip. Since the
plasma has an electrical resistivity, the plasma current will contribute to the
heating of the plasma, an effect which is generally referred to as ohmic heating
of the plasma.
Thus, the magnet system of a tokamak needs to consist of coils able to
perform three basic tasks:
-11-
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Bt: toroidal magnetic field
B.: poloidal magnetic field
IP: plasma current
R
plasma
p
central solenoid
PF coils (main
transformer coils)
k: toroidal coil current
TF coi outer PF ring coils
Internal PF ring coils
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Scheme of a Tokamak Coil System
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1. To produce the toroidal magnetic field;
2. To induce the plasma current by providing enough unidirectional flux
change; and
3. To produce the magnetic fields required for stabilization and shaping of
the plasma.
The fulfillment of these tasks will require magnet systems of very large scale,
which produce enormous magnetic fields and store large amounts of energy. Such
magnet systems can be regarded as being essentially fusion specific devices for
which no technical analogs existed in the past.
1.2 Reliability Aspects in Fusion R&D
At the present time, a number of major experimental tokimak machines are
operating or being designed. In the United States, the Tokamak Fusion Test
Reactor (TFTR) is operating in Princeton, New Jersey, and a compact machine,
the Compact Ignition Tokamak (CIT) is planned for the same site in the early
1990's. In Western Europe, the current experimental machine, the Joint
European Torus (JET) in Culham, Great Britain, is likely to be succeeded by
the Next European Torus (NET), which might start operation around the year
2000 and is of significantly larger size than CIT. The new machines are
expected to achieve conditions better than energy breakeven when fueled with a
mixture of Deuterium and Tritium (D-T). The currently operating machines
have been operating with Deuterium fuel and may be upgraded for use of D-T
fuel in the future.
For fusion in order to fulfill its goals and become an economical and
publicly acceptable major source of energy in the future, the reliable and safe
operation of future fusion devices must be proven once the technical feasibility of
fusion has been demonstrated. At the present time, the designs of fusion
systems involve large uncertainties about their reliability. However, early design
decisions, i.e., decisions made in the current R&D phase, will have a large
impact on the performance and costs of the final design.
-13-
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Therefore, reliability and safety considerations need to be incorporated into
the design of fusion machines or reactor subsystems during all phases of the
design. Design decisions should be based on an overall design concept and be
reviewed continuously as more detailed information becomes available. An
appropriate design concept should allow to project the consequences of present
design developments on the safety and costs of future devices, thereby improving
the design and the allocation of design efforts. This is important since it allows
for communicating the desirable reliability and safety goals, and examining the
impact of various design options on the projected cost of electricity. Such
approaches to the cost assessment of fusion reactors have already been developed
[Sheffield 1986].
In addition, there have been a number of studies on the safety and
reliability of magnet systems, some of which will be discussed in the following.
In an early study of superconducting magnet systems [Hsieh 1978],
engineering safety features of magnet systems were examined. A preliminary
assessment cf accident initiators and potential failure consequences for a generic
superconducting magnet system was made, including structural, thermal -hydraulic
and electrical safety concerns. Also, an approach to fusion magnet safety was
outlined, and it was concluded that a number of elaborate engineered safety
features would be required to limit the risk of a loss of mission of a fusion
reactor due to magnet failure.
The International Tokamak Reactor Study (INTOR) (see, for example
[INTOR 1986]) included a comparison of alternative approaches to the design of
TF magnets. This comparison was based on a weighted matrix of such aspects
as the maturity of technology, their reactor compatibility, their reliability and
costs [INTOR 1982], but the weighting factors were based on engineering
judgment rather than quantitative failure analysis. Furthermore, a number of
studies on selected aspects of magnet safety have been conducted as part of
INTOR, like a study on the consequences of severe magnet failures which could
lead to damage of surrounding structures [Arendt 1981]. For example, the
potential effect of a complete rupture of a coil winding with subsequent missile
generation was evaluated.
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In recent years, several experimental facilities have been used to study
magnet failures and safety features, and availability records of such devices were
increasingly kept. One such device has been TESPE (Toroidales Energie
Speicher Experiment) [Jilngst 1987], where a set of toroidial coils was used to
study for example magnet discharge behavior and arcing failures. Also, the
Large Coil Task (LCT) [Ulbricht 1987] provided vast insights into the
manufacturing, operation and failure handling of toroidal field coils of large scale
for the first time.
While these studies investigated mainly the safety features of magnets, the
availability of magnet systems was included in a study by Musicki [Musicki
1983]. A Monte Carlo method was employed to calculate the approximate
availability of a fusion mirror machine. The cost of electricity was computed as
a function of the availability, and its sensitivity to several design changes was
examined. Safety considerations were not included in this study. It was
concluded that adding a redundant unit will be preferable to increasing the
availability of a single unit for major subsystems of the magnet systems. The
entire magnet system was identified as one of the potential major unavailability
driving reactor subsystems, i.e., its contribution to the overall unavailability of
the reactor can be large compared to that of other reactor subsystems. This
was found to be due to the high importance of the magnet system for the
operation of the entire plant and since the redundancy options for coils are very
limited.
In a following study [Watanabe 1986], this fusion reactor availability analysis
was extended to model systems with normal, degraded, and failed states.
However, both studies indicated the lack of reliability data as the major effect
leading to large uncertainties in the availability analysis. It was concluded that
the error in modeling the system can only be reduced by doing careful analysis
of reactor design studies.
In another study [Piet 1986], an overview was given of how to incorporate
safety and economical considerations into design decision making. This approach,
risk-based design, suggested probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) as the basis for
decision making in order to enhance fusion safety and plant availability, and
-15-
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yields a generic method to compare design options. Also, system interactions
can be highlighted, since a PRA requires an examination of the entire system,
possibly leading to the search for less complex solutions, which are in turn likely
to yield more reliable designs.
This framework was later extended and applied to the design of the
Compact Ignition Tokamak [Cadwallader 1987]. The objective was to identify all
failures that could possibly lead to a loss of mission of CIT. A Failure Modes
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for loss of mission was performed and yielded
significant insight into the failure pathways which can contribute most to a
possible loss of mission. The magnet system was identified as one of the fusion
device subsystems whose failure could lead to a loss of mission for CIT. Since
CIT will use D-T (Deuterium-Tritium) fuel, safety considerations will become
increasingly important, and risk-based design will become more useful and
required to fulfill safety regulations.
In the European fusion research program, a reliability and availability
assessment program is being conducted for NET [Bnlnde 1987a]. Several
constraints on the availability of the NET reactor regarding successful
experimental and diagnostic operations have been imposed in order to achieve the
goals of NET. The reliability and availability assessment is based on a Failure
Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis. The goal is to improve the design of
the system by updating the reliability and availability assessment in an iterative
procedure as more information becomes available. Reliability actions are
proposed during each iteration based on the sensitivity of the availability of
critical components or subsystems to design changes. Critical components or
subsystems are those systems, which can be regarded as unavailability drivers of
the fusion plant.
1.3 Objectives of this Study
The objective of this study is to contribute to improving the reliability of
fusion magnet systems and reducing the risk associated with the operation of
magnet systems. Areas of uncertainties about modes of failures and fault
consequences are identified. Failures of the electrical system of the PF magnets
are examined as an example of those areas.
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Previous sections have shown, that magnet systems are of major importance
for the technical feasibility of fusion and the operation of fusion devices. In
addition, issues like development, manufacturing and operation costs,
maintenance, i.e., the repair and replacement of magnets, and the safe deposition
of the stored magnetic energy in case of faults need to be incorporated in the
design. Magnet systems are potential unavailability drivers and magnet failures
may lead to a loss of mission of the entire fusion device. The redundancy
options for the coils are furthermore severely limited. Nevertheless, despite of
the high importance of magnet systems, the database of magnet failures and
fault consequences is still weak and further analysis is needed.
This study is therefore partitioned into two parts, a failure analysis of fusion
magnet systems, and an analysis of the consequences of an exemplary group of
failures which are electrical failures in the PF magnet system.
The failure analysis is presented in Chapter 2 and helps to identify areas
which might require further design modifications. Based on the functional
breakdown and the preliminary fault tree analysis of the NET TF coils [Biinde
1987a], several failure levels including physical failure modes are added using a
variety of sources from the literature (the main source being the INTOR study,
see for example [INTOR 1986]). This failure analysis is then extended to the
PF magnet system, and the major differences of potential failure modes of the
TF and PF magnet systems are discussed. Furthermore, for the first time an
extensive analysis of interactions within the PF magnet system and with other
reactor subsystems, which are caused by the operation of the PF magnets, is
performed.
The failure mode and interaction analysis from Chapter 2 shows that the
major differences in the failure modes of the TF and the PF magnet systems
arise from the pulsed operation of the PF magnets. This operation mode will
require a complex electrical and control system for the PF magnets. This
implies a large potential for interactions triggered by electrical failures in the PF
magnet system.
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Therefore, the objective of the second part of this study is to examine the
potential consequences for the TF and the PF coils resulting form electrical
failures in the PF magnet system. This analysis is presented in Chapter 3.
Based on an examination of reported electrical failures and on the potential
properties of future electrical systems of PF magnets, fault scenarios are selected.
These fault scenarios are then simulated using a simplified electromagnetic model
of CIT.
Finally, Chapter 4 includes a summary of the results, conclusions that are
obtained in this study, and recommendations for areas of future work.
The appendices include the notation that is used for the fault tree analysis,
the operation and load scenario for the external PF coils of CIT, the potential
disruption scenarios for CIT used for the fault consequence analysis, and the
simulation models that are used in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 2
FAILURE ANALYSIS OF MAGNET SYSTEMS
An analysis of the failure modes of the entire magnet system is needed as a
first step to identify design axeas which might require further modifications. It
can also be helpful to identify potentially important contributors to system
failures. Therefore, the main intention of the failure analysis in this Chapter is
to obtain an improved understanding of the functional interactions within this
complex system rather than to give a detailed description of failure modes which
can occur for specific magnet designs. However, in order to include lower levels
of physical failures which, e.g., can show the impact of interactions between
magnet subsystems, a more specific design needs to be considered. The main
reference design for the failure mode analysis in this study is that of the TF
magnet system for the Next European Torus (NET). The NET reliability and
availability assurance program has already established a concept for a failure
modes, effects and criticality analysis of the NET toroidal field magnet system.
This includes a functional breakdown of the magnet system and preliminary fault
and event trees (see, for example [Bfinde 1987], [Bflnde 1987a], and [Biinde
1988]).
The analysis in this Chapter builds on the concepts and the currently
available results of this NET program. Furthermore, the notation of the Plant
Component Identification Scheme (PCIS) of NET [Bfinde 1988a] is used
throughout this Chapter wherever applicable. Such an identification scheme is
found to be very helpful in organizing the system breakdown and the failure
analysis.
In this study, a failure mode analysis for a superconducting TF magnet
system is presented. Some modifications of the system boundaries are made and
the NET fault trees are extended to include several levels of failure modes
defined in terms of physical failures rather than component unavailability. It
thereby provides an overview of potential sources of failures in fusion magnet
systems. The failure mode analysis in this Chapter is furthermore extended to
the PF magnet system while the NET analysis examines the TF magnet system.
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Boundaries for the analysis of the PF magnet system are suggested and the main
differences in the failure modes of the PF and the TF magnet systems are
identified. Furthermore, for the first time an extensive analysis of the
interactions with the TF magnets and other reactor subsystems, which are caused
by the PF magnet system, is performed. For this interaction analysis the concept
of a Fault Interaction Matrix suggested in earlier studies [Piet 1986] is extended
to an Interaction Matrix showing interactions occurring under normal operating
and fault conditions.
Clearly, since the database for fusion magnet systems is being developed at
the present time, and existing magnet systems and magnet designs show
considerable differences, the failure analysis presented in this Chapter can only be
representative for the design of a "generic" magnet system which is believed to
have similar properties to future magnet systems. In this regard, this analysis
cannot be considered as being final or complete for a specific magnet design.
2.1 Functional Breakdown of the Magnet System
A functional breakdown yields the basis for further failure analysis of the
magnet system. For a system with a variety of tasks like the magnet system, a
design will be desirable where the different tasks can be achieved independently,
that is the design is desired to be functionally decoupled. This will not always
be achievable or may be impossible. Hence, the design of a magnet system
leads to a number of interactions within the system. Those interactions will be
discussed in Chapter 2.3 in more detail since they are not explicitly represented
in the failure mode analysis in Chapter 2.2.
The magnet system of a tokamak reactor consists of TF and PF coils. The
TF coils have to provide the toroidal magnetic field. Those coils will have to
carry very large currents, on the order of 10 MA per coil, and are likely to
remain energized for long periods of time in order to keep the energization costs
low. Also, in order to avoid large energy losses in these coils, the TF coils of
future magnet systems are expected to be superconducting.
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PF coils are needed to induce the plasma current and to produce the
magnetic fields which control and stabilize the plasma shape and its position.
Therefore, these coils need to be operated in a pulsed mode, where the length of
a single pulse will probably lie between a few seconds to a few minutes. Since
the problem of energy losses is therefore less severe than for TF coils, resistive
or superconducting PF coils may be imagined for future reactors, but
superconducting coils will be highly preferable.
Following these considerations, the entire magnet system can be broken
down into the TF and the PF magnet systemst (AB respectively AC in the
PCIS notationt). Each of these magnet systems can then be broken down
further into four major types of subsystems. These are the coil system, coil
cooling system, power supply system and the protection and control system, as
illustrated for the TF magnet system in Fig. 2-1.
Each magnet system needs several coils to perform its tasks and three types
of coil systems can be distinguished:
1. TF coil systems (ABA), of which an entire TF magnet system will have
approximately 10 to 20 and which are alike and feature superconducting
coils;
2. An external PF coil system (ACA), which consists of coils of the same
type, and performs the task of inducing the plasma current and
providing the basic shape of the plasma in an integrated way, i.e., there
axe no coils assigned to a single function only. Therefore, a further
breakdown of this system into single coils is not performed. These
external PF coils are likely to be all normal- or all superconducting;
and
3. An internal PF coil system (A CB), which is likely to feature resistive
coils since they are operated under severe environmental conditions.
t Throughout this report, magnet system refers to the entire TF or PF magnet system, while the
term coil system refers only to the coil winding and its directly connected equipment. Thus, a
magnet system may consist of several coil systems.
t The PCIS notation from NET [Bunde 1988] is introduced in this section and mostly used in
future sections without mentioning the name of the system or component. PCIS notations are
always in italics.
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Each coil contributes to the control of the plasma position and shape, but
more than one coil will be required to fulfill a single control function for the
plasma. This again suggests that the system of internal coils be considered
as a whole and not by breaking it down into single coils.
Each coil within a coil system is treated equally, i.e., as having the same
functional breakdown, and the breakdown of a single coil system is shown in Fig.
2-1 for a TF coil. Each coil is expected to consist of several pancakes (GM),
which are connected in series to form the coil winding. The winding obtains its
electrical power from two current leads (GD). The pancakes and the electrical
connections between them will be cooled, and cooling pipe connections for coolant
inlet (GK) and outlet (GA) are required. Depending on the manufacturing and
assembly of the pancakes (e.g., whether a single pancake or a double pancake
design is used), those coolant pipe connections may be designed quite differently.
For most superconducting magnets, in particular for TF coils, the winding will
be embedded in a coil casing (GL1) which partially supports the operational
loads on the conductor and protects the pancake arrangement against external
impacts. A casing for auxiliary devices (GL2) may also be required for parts of
the cooling system and the instrumentation of the coils [Bfinde 1987].
The TF coil cases will be supported by the central support structure (which
is not connected to the central stack of PF coils), a gravitational support
structure, and an intercoil support structure, which mainly supports the out-of-
plane loadst on the TF coils. The entire support structure will be referred to as
BQ. The PF coil supports are different for coils in the central stack and the
outer coils. Central PF coils will be supported by a central support column
structure, while the outer coils may be supported by the TF coil case or by a
separate intercoil structure. The internal coils are integrated in the TF coil
structure.
Electrical instrumentation of the coils (GY1) and the current leads (GY2) is
also included in the coil system. Coolant flow rates, coolant temperature and
pressure will be measured at several locations in the cooling system of the
t Out-of-plane loads axe loads acting in a direction perpendicular to the plane of the coil current.
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winding and the leads. Furthermore, each pancake will incorporate
instrumentation for voltage and current measurements, ground fault monitoring,
and strain gauges for strain and displacement measurements [Dinsmore 1986].
The coolant for each coil system will be provided by a coil cooling system
(system ABK for a TF coil system and system A CK for the entire PF coil
system). It can be expected that these cooling systems have to provide
cryogenic coolant, such as liquid helium (LHe), liquid nitrogen (LN 2) or both.
The coolant is provided by a cryogenic coolant system for the entire plant. A
coil cooling system consists of the main coolant supply lines for the winding and
the leads. The coolant flow rate will be regulated by valves at the inlet and
outlet of each main coolant pipe as illustrated in Fig. 2-1. The flow rate in the
pancakes will probably not need to be adjusted during operation, but can be
adjusted once at the beginning of operation under use of orifices or manifolds as
proposed for NET. Since the coil case and the main coolant pipe may have
different electrical potential, electrical isolators will be needed between them
[Biinde 1987], as shown in Fig. 2-1.
The electrical power for the coils is provided by the power supply system.
For the TF coils, alternate coils will be connected in series to reduce the
potential for unbalanced (asymmetric) forces on the TF coils under fault
conditions. Therefore, and because of the steady state-like operation mode of
the TF coils, two power supply units, one for each set of alternate coils, are
sufficient. The TF coil power supply system (ABL) may be set up as illustrated
in Fig. 2-2 [INTOR 1985]. Cooled busbars (GW) will be needed to connect
power supplies and current leads. Furthermore, a separate protection circuit may
be required for each TF coil (in particular when superconducting coils are used),
in order to ensure the safe discharge of energized coils in the case of a failure.
Such a protection circuit consists of a dump resistor (GU) with appropriate
cooling and a safety discharge switch (GS), and is considered to be part of the
protection and control system (ABY). The PF coil power supply system (ACL)
is significantly more complex than the TF coil power supply system since each
PF coil follows a different current scenario. This system will be described in
more detail in Chapter 3.1.
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Fig. 2-2. Scheme of a TF Magnet Power Supply [INTOR 1985a]
The last subsystem of the TF or PF magnet system is the protection and
control system (ABY and ACY, respectively). It includes all instrumentation
and protective devices not included in the coil system, the coil cooling system or
the power supply system, and provides the communication between each of these
subsystems for the TF and the PF system. The protection and control systems
obtain commands and control signals from higher level control systems, the
magnet system, and related reactor subsystems (like the fueling system), and
decide upon magnet shutdown when disturbances or failures are indicated. For a
superconducting magnet system, this protection and control system will therefore
include quench detection modules and a fast external discharge system [Dinsmore
1986]. The PF control and protection system will be significantly more complex,
and is described in more detail in Section 3.1.
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The choice of the subsystems and the breakdown of the magnet system is
important for the clarity of the failure analysis and a good choice may simplify
the tracking of failure modes and interactions in the system significantly. For the
presented functional breakdown, the boundaries of the coil cooling system and
the protection and control system are most difficult to draw. The coil cooling
system will have strong connections to other parts of the cooling system. As an
example, coolant flow rates, temperature, pressure and the level of impurities in
the coolant depend on the coil cooling system and on the overall cryogenic
cooling system. However, including the overall cryogenic cooling system in the
coil cooling system would destroy the modular structure of the fault trees (one
fault tree per coil system), and lead to a system much more difficult to examine.
Also, the cryogenic cooling system, although mainly supplying the magnet
system, can be regarded as an external supply whose design has little
implications for the design of the magnet system.
This is very similar to the external TF coils power supply system which
provides power for the two power supply units of the TF coils. However, it is
clearly different from the external PF coils power supply system (as will be
shown in Chapter 3.1) since its design is deeply connected to the design of the
other parts of the PF magnet system.
The boundaries of the protection and control systems should be determined
so that instrumentation and control devices are excluded whose functioning is
connected to a very high degree to the operation or the environmental conditions
in another subsystem. This is, for instance, the case for the instrumentation of
the coils (GY1 or GY2), but not for the safety discharge system of the coils
(GU and GS). However, the actions of control or protection devices may still
contribute highly to the interactions between systems across the system
boundaries as will be seen in Chapter 2.3.
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2.2 Failure Mode Analysis of Magnet Systems
In this section, a failure modes analysis of a magnet system is presented as
it emerges from the functional breakdown of the magnet system which is
described in Chapter 2.1. The analytical method which is used in this study to
derive the failure modes is fault tree analysis. Fault tree analysis is now a
widely accepted tool for failure mode analysis, but the completeness may be
difficult to achieve for complex systems. There have been new approaches to
the generation of fault trees, like the Logic Flowgraph Methodology (LFM)
[Guarro 1985], where the failure modes of the system are derived from a physical
model, and which lead to an improved construction process for fault trees.
However, since LFM requires quantification of the progression of system
disturbances, and the current database on the operation of magnet systems does
not provide such information, simpler methods are currently more rewarding.
Fault tree analysis is used in this study like in other programs (see, for example
[Biinde 1987a]).
In a fault tree analysis, the fault trees are developed by skarting from a
postulated "top event" of the system failure mode and progressing downward to
lower levels of failures. Lower level failure modes are obtained by answering
questions like "which process(es) or failure(s) can cause the top event to occur".
By progressing downward, newly derived failure modes become themselves top
events of the given level in the fault tree. The procedure stops when further
breakdown of the failure modes would not yield any further contribution to
achieving the goal of the analysis, or cannot be performed due to lack of
knowledge about the failure mechanism(s). Failure modes of the first category
will be called basic failure modes. The entire fault tree finally shows the
various failure sequence paths whose occurrence yields the top event and gives
the logical connections between the failure modes which lead to the top event.
The set of tools which is used to present these connections is described in
Appendix A.
For the magnet system, the top event is "failure to provide the magnetic
field required for plasma operation". This means, that any event which makes
the operation of the plasma impossible or unsafe and thereby requires a deviation
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from the desired operation schedule during a certain period of time is defined as
a failure event. The period between failure initiation and failure clearance is
called downtime and can range from a few minutes or hours to years, depending
on the severity of the fault consequences. As an example, detected quenches
may not necessarily cause damage, and may be associated with short downtimes,
while structural coil failures may lead to downtimes on the order of several
months.
The top event can be caused by a failure of the TF or the PF magnet
system to provide the magnetic fields required for plasma operation, and thereby
by a failure in any of the magnet subsystems. For this part of the fault tree,
which is shown in Fig. 2-3, the failure modes can be described in general as
"unavailability of a system" and [Bilnde 1987 has used this notation to derive a
similar fault tree. The important result from structuring the system and the
resulting fault tree in this way, is that the highest levels of the fault trees
contain only OR-gates, which can simplify the reliability assessment (i.e., the
quantification of top event failure probabilities) significantly.
In the following sections, the fault tree structures for the four major
subsystems of the magnet system are presented. The TF magnet system is
taken as an example, and the differences from the PF magnet system are
discussed in the last section.
2.2.1 The Coil System
The functional breakdown of the coil system translates directly into the fault
tree structure shown in Fig. 2-4 for a single superconducting coil system. The
total number of TF coil systems can be approximately 10 to 20 (it is 16 for
NET and 20 for CIT). In this section, the fault trees and the major failure
modes for each of the failures in the lowest level in Fig. 2-4 are discussed.
2.2.1.1 Internal Failure in a Single Pancake
The fault tree for a single superconducting pancake, which consists of several
turns, has internal support (a conduit), and is designed to be cryostable, is
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shown in Fig. 2-5. Cryogenic stabilization means, that the conductor can
recover after it has lost its superconductivity for a short time, at least for most
possible disturbances. Currently used materials for superconducting magnets of
large scale are NbTi, and in fewer applications Nb3Sn.
These superconductors must be operated within a three-dimensional
parameter space of conductor temperature, magnetic field and current density
(see, for example [Raeder 1981]). The boundary curves of this allowable
parameter space yield the so called critical values for temperature, field strength
and current density which may not be exceeded without losing the
superconducting properties of the conductor. Since the maximum allowable
temperature is in the -range of a few Kelvin the conductors must be cooled by a
cryogenic coolant such as LHe (usually at 4.2K). However, when a conductor
loses its superconducting properties locally, its resistance increases rapidly and
the resistive spot becomes an internal heat source. This heating could lead to
propagation of the resistive zone along the conductor, which is called a quench.
This can be avoided in most cases when the conductor is cryogenically stable.
Then, a stabilizer which is usually made of copper or aluminum, but at least a
material whose resistivity is lower than that of the superconducting material
when it is resistive, is needed to carry the coil current for the time the
superconductor needs to cool down and recover, so that the superconductor can
carry the current again.
In general, a pancake fails when it loses its superconducting properties
permanently, develops a short, arcs within itself or to surrounding structures, or
when its internal structure fails. Fig. 2-5 illustrates that this can happen when
the electrical insulation of the pancake to ground or between turns fails. The
insulation to ground will be very design specific and has to withstand high
voltages during fast external discharges of the coil. The insulation between turns
can fail for several reasons. Mechanical penetrations of the insulation,
permanently or under special load conditions (e.g., during emergency discharges)
can lead to local shorts and arcing in the coil, e.g., when an insufficiently
supported sensor lead is pressed against the insulation,' a failure that has already
been reported in a magnet failure survey [Thome 1986].
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The insulation can also fail due to fatigue from repeated mechanical loading.
Cyclical shear stresses in the insulation may lead to cracking, and a severe
degradation of the insulating properties. If the insulation bears part of the
mechanical load on the conductor, then its structural failure can lead to a loss
of the mechanical integrity of the coil. This may be of particular importance
for superconducting magnets, where the insulation may bear a larger portion of
the total load since the superconducting wire may not be able to support a
similarly large portion of the load than the wire in resistive magnets.
The cyclic mechanical and thermal stresses, together with the consequences
of previous stresses, e.g., a deterioration of the insulation due to excessive
stresses during previous quenches or disruptions, can abrade the insulation
steadily, finally leading to wear-out failures. The cyclic mechanical loads on the
TF coil insulation results from the interaction of the TF coil currents with the
cyclic magnetic field of the PF coils. This causes loads on the conductor, part
of which may be transferred to the insulation. In this regard, mainly the shear
stresses resulting from the out-of-plane loads on the TF coils are important.
But, abrasion can also occur due to differential movements between insulation
and turns in circumferential direction, caused by different mechanical or thermal
stresses, e.g., due to different elasticity moduli or thermal expansion coefficients.
Abrasion is supported when rough surfaces of the turns are present, which is
determined by manufacturing, assembly or design tolerances on surface quality.
Differential movements can also be reduced when the turns are tightly packed
[Hsieh 1978]. This failure behavior is an example of a situation where multiple
continuous effects or continuous combinations of them may lead to the failure of
the entire part. Such a relationship is referred to by a CAND-gate notation
[Siu 1988], which will be retained for the remainder of this study. Improper
assembly and manufacturing of pancakes may also lead to insulation failure.
This has been reported in a failure survey [Thome 1986], where in one case the
insulation in a coil was even locally missing. Also, flaws or metal inclusions,
etc., may occur but should be detectable during the burn-in phase of the
magnets. The importance of the assembly and manufacturing process emphasizes
the need for an extensive testing and quality control program of the magnets
before they are implemented and operated in the final plant, so that early
failures can be detected and repaired more easily.
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The breakdown voltage of the insulation can be deteriorated continuously by
multiple continuous effects. Depending on the choice of insulation materials, it
can be very sensitive to irradiation, e.g., due to radiolytic decomposition of
organic insulations or glues [Hsieh 1978], or undergo chemical reactions with
surrounding material, e.g., organic glues. The breakdown voltage can also be
lowered by a reduction of the distance between surfaces of different electrical
potential, e.g. when coolant channel spacers experience creep. Also, if cooling
channels were used within insulation between turns (which is not assumed here)
a warmup of the coolant may reduce its breakdown voltage, in particular for
helium coolant.
The pancake can also fail when its internal cooling channels fall. The
cooling channels can be deformed by sudden mechanical loads on the conductor
(e.g. disruption loads) or overpressurization. Overpressure could for example
occur during quenches and fast external discharges when the entire coolant heats
up and causes a fast pressure rise when the pressure is not relieved by rupture
disks or similar devices [INTOR 1985a].
Furthermore, a blockage of cooling channels can arrive from the
accumulation of impurities like abraded material or from the external cooling
system. Also, ice can be built up at bottlenecks of the cooling system, e.g.,
impurity water or N2 in liquid nitrogen cooled systems, or also 02 or N2
impurities in a system cooled with liquid helium.
A very important failure mode of the pancake is the failure of the current
carrying superconducting wire itself, for which a fault tree is shown in Fig. 2-6.
Either a structural failure of the wire or a degradation of its current carrying
capability can lead to the top event, but the importance of single failure events
for causing the top event strongly depends on the chosen superconducting
material, which is NbTi or Nb3Sn for current magnet systems.
A degradation of the current carrying capability, i.e., an increase in the
resistivity of the conductor or a reduced parameter operation space for the
temperature, magnetic field, and current density can be induced by three
different continuous effects. In general, Nb3Sn is capable of withstanding a
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higher magnetic field and carrying a larger current density than NbTi at the
same temperature. However, the critical current density for Nb3Sn degrades
rapidly above a certain neutron fluence limit as the result of radiation induced
disorder while Nb Ti is essentially insensitive to irradiation (Gross 1984, Salpietro
1987]. Also, the current carrying capability of Nb3Sn is very sensitive to strains.
In this regard, the manufacturing and assembly process is of importance, but
strains during operation can also damage the conductor.
Furthermore, heating of the superconductor can contribute to failure
initiation. Potential heat sources for the conductor are alternating current (AC)
losses during operation, heating due to movement of the current carrying wire in
a magnetic field, and nuclear heating. AC losses are caused by changing
magnetic fields and are particularly high during disruptions. Two types of AC
losses can be distinguished: hysteresis and eddy current losses. Hysteresis losses,
are about proportional to the diameter of the superconducting wire and and of
the stabilizer, and lead to internal and external heating of the current-carrying
wire. Eddy current losses can be significantly reduced by adding barriers of high
resistance (e.g., CuNi) to the stabilizer [Raeder 1981].
Heating of the conductor can also be caused by frictional heating because of
differential movements between insulation and conductor [INTOR 1985a] (due to
different thermal expansion coefficients and magnetic loads), and can arrive from
movements in the winding case, e.g., due to unstable fixing or lack of tension in
the packing under magnetic loads [INTOR 1982a]. Also, nuclear heating, i.e.,
heat derived from prompt gamma capture in the conductor and adjacent
structures can contribute to conductor damage.
The current carrying wire can also experience structural failure, which can
be caused by the combined effect of strain and irradiation damage. In particular
Nb3Sn is an inherently brittle material, and the total strain resulting from
manufacturing, assembly and operation must be kept below 0.2% [INTOR 1985a].
This means, that the strain history is of high importance for Nb3Sn magnets,
and the conductor must be well constrained during operation.
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The effect of irradiation on the structural properties of NbTi and Nb3Sn
needs more study. Cracks developing in the conductor material could lead to
structural failure. Cracks reduce the effective current carrying cross section of
the conductor, leading to higher local current densities, increased local mechanical
loads, and possibly quenches.
Like the wire, the stabilizer can fail to perform its task when its resistivity
increases during operation, that means more heat is produced in case of a quench
since the process of current transfer from the wire becoming normalconducting to
the stabilizer would be delayed and the current carrying stabilizer would produce
more heat as well. In most applications, aluminum or copper are used as
stabilizer material, and the biggest problem may be the irradiation induced
damage [Raeder 1981]. However, cracks in the stabilizer resulting from cyclic or
excessive operational loads, or from errors during manufacturing or assembly, can
lead to an increased resistance since the effective current carrying cross section is
reduced. The crack propagation may then even be accelerated by the increased
current density, heating and mechanical loading of the remaining effective cross
section.
Impurities or inclusions in the stabilizer material may lead to a higher
resistance of the stabilizer than rated at the beginning of operation. Another,
although nonpermanent and less significant contribution to an increased stabilizer
resistance can be AC losses, which may lead to an increased operating
temperature of the stabilizer and thereby higher resistivity. Finally, the pancake
fails if it looses its mechanical support. This can be caused by separation of
the conducting material from the stabilizer due to deterioration of the bonding
strength [INTOR 1982a], or structural failure of the insulation if it is used as
additional conductor support [INTOR 1985a).
A variety of conductor designs include a conduit support structure [INTOR
1982], so that a structural failure of the conduit would lead to the failure of the
pancake. The conduit structure can fail due to fatigue caused by cyclic
mechanical loading, or by sudden excessive electromagnetic forces, e.g., during a
quench or disruption. Furthermore, the conduit has to withstand large internal
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coolant pressures (depending on the specific design) that may occur during fast
external discharges of the coil [INTOR 1982a].
2.2.1.2 Failure of the Current Leads
The design of current leads for fusion magnets strongly depends on the
conductor and cryostat design. In general, the leads need to cross the cryostat
boundary and will require flexible support to allow the movements of conductor
and leads under operation. This may be accomplished by bellows (Ulbricht
1987].
The leads will connect normal and superconducting wires, and a complicated
cooling system (often with two coolants, LN 2 and LHe), is required. Therefore,
the current leads are considered to be a very sensitive element in the design of
magnet systems [Bfinde 1987]. Failure of the current leads may be caused by
failure of the insulation, a structural failure of the lead support and/or
encapsulation structure, a structural failure of the lead itself, or when the leads
are insufficiently cooled [Biinde 1987]. A fault tree for the current lead is shown
in Fig. 2-7.
Such failures of the current leads are of high concern, since local discharges
or arcs could develop, which could effectively shortcircuit the entire coil and
involve the deposition of most of the coil energy in a highly concentrated
manner at the leads (see, e.g., [Arendt 1981]), since no external safety discharge
can be initiated.
A particular problem of leads cooled with helium may be the temperature
sensitivity of the breakdown voltage of helium [Arendt 1981]. In order to
prevent discharges through the coolant, the helium temperature needs to be well
controlled, in particular during fast external discharges of the coil which may
lead to heating of the coolant and high voltages at the leads.
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2.2.1.3 Failure of Coil Casing
The casing of the coils supports the operational loads on the conductor and
transfers them to the coil support structure, thereby constraining conductor
movement. The coil case experiences static (e.g., the centering force on the TF
coils) and cyclic loads (e.g., the out-of-plane loads on the TF coils), which may
lead to a break of the casing due to fatigue or excessive static stresses (e.g.,
during quenches or disruptions). Also, the case will have to be cooled since the
eddy current losses in the case may be high. This causes a potential for pipe
failures like leaks or pipe breaks [Bfinde 1987]. The energy losses can be
reduced by adding barriers of high electrical resistance to the case, although this
may reduce the mechanical strength of the casing.
2.2.1.4 Failure of the Coil Support Structure
The TF coil support structure fails if the central support structure, the
intercoil support structure or the gravitational support structure fails.
The failure modes of the central support structure depend on whether the
bucking or the wedging concept is chosen. With the bucking concept, the loads
from the TF coils are transferred to the support structure for the stack of
central PF coils. The centering (inward) force, and the torque on the TF coils
are well supported in this design, but the differential rotational movements
between both support structures are undesirable. Therefore, although JET has
used a bucking design, the wedging concept is proposed for machines like NET,
and is under discussion for the International Tokamak Experimental Reactor
(ITER), mainly driven by reliability concerns about the bucking design.
With the wedging concept, there is no direct contact between the central
support structures of the TF and the PF coils, and thus friction between these
structures is avoided and the PF coil support is free to expand radially.
Instead, the forces and moments are transferred between adjacent coil cases by
friction. Since the out-of-plane loads on the TF coils are cyclic, there is a
potential for fatigue failure of the support structure. Also, repeated relative
motions may lead to wear at wedging surfaces. Furthermore, asymmetric loads,
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e.g., caused by nonsimultaneous discharges of the TF coils, may lead to local
displacements of the wedges, and the gap between the TF and the PF support
structure may be lost. In addition, the strength of the material may degrade
due to irradiation, depending on the shielding between the support structure and
the plasma.
The intercoil structure is also subject to cyclic loads and high static loads in
the event of asymmetric loads on the TF coils, which can lead to structural
failure. Structural constraints in radial directions, can lead to thermal stresses
on the intercoil structure.
Flexibility in radial direction is also important for the gravitational support
structure in order to allow for thermal expansion of the coil and to reduce the
thermal stresses. Furthermore, cyclic rotational movements of the coils need to
be reacted, and the static weight of the coils is to be supported. The vertical
loads on the coil structure during disruptions can be significant and can reduce
the available margin for operational loads permanently. Therefore, the
gravitational support structure may fail due to fatigue (taking into account the
stress history) or overloads.
2.2.1.5 Failure of Electrical Connections (Joints)
There are three failure modes for electrical connections with coolant inlet or
outlet [Biinde 1987]: the coolant piping (mainly welds) could leak or break, the
electrical connection could break down due to insulation or material failure, and
mechanical loads, e.g., arriving from constraints on the movement of the joints,
can cause a break of the joint.
2.2.1.6 Failure of Casing for Auxiliary Devices
A casing for auxiliary devices like joints or instrumentation may be needed
to insulate them from areas of different electrical potential and protect these
devices against external impacts. Such a casing has been proposed for the NET
design. The failure modes are the break of the casing itself [Bfinde 1987] or a
breakdown of the electrical insulation of the casing.
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2.2.1.7 Failure of the Protection and Control Equipment
The protection and control equipment of the coil system has to detect and
transfer signals to higher level control and protection systems (like e.g., ABY).
The mechanisms which can lead to the failure of this signal detection and
distribution process are very similar for all kinds of measurements when the
signals are processed and forwarded electrically. Fig. 2-8 shows a fault tree for
such systems. The top event of this fault tree is the failure of the system to
provide the correct signal as input to another control system, i.e., the wrong
indication of an existing condition or no indication of an out-of-bound condition.
The processed signal can either be a continuously sensed signal or a signal
describing whether a limit condition is reached. The top event can then occur
when the sensing equipment itself fails or the signal is deteriorated during the
following signal processing stage.
A failure of the sensor hardware, which will depend on the type of
measurement, will cause an instrumentation equipment failure. Hardware failure
will also strongly depend on the environmental conditions at the sensor location,
and thereby on sensor placement and the robustness of the sensor and
measurement principle. Calibration errors will be important, and can be caused
by a shift of calibration points during operation or by errors in the initial
calibration (mainly human errors). This may be of particular importance for the
setting of limit values lSchnauder 1987], and can lead to consistent systematic
errors. Also, in case of active sensors requiring external energy, the placement
of sensor leads will be important for failures involving sensor power outages.
Therefore, the placement of the sensors and leads, and their assembly may have
a strong impact on the reliability of the sensor instrumentation.
Signal processing failures can also occur due to hardware failures or when
the signal is deteriorated by external sources. Hardware failures include failures
of signal transmitting cables and signal amplifiers. The signal can be
deteriorated during processing when signals deciding upon the same issue are
coupled by the instrumentation system, leading to dependent signal processing.
Furthermore, electrical noise from the environment, e.g., resulting from magnetic
fields, flux jumps or coil motions may lead to the misinterpretation of signals.
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As an example, it may be difficult to distinguish between a coil quench or a
short circuit from a noisy signal. Again, the hostile environmental conditions for
the sensors need to be taken into account when sensor equipment is selected.
Clearly, the failure rates for the measurement and processing of a single
variable also depend on the monitoring, repair and maintenance procedures.
Voting logics (like 2-out-of 3 voting logics proposed for most of the NET
instrumentation [Biinde 19871) may be used to rely less on single measurements
and to enhance the overall reliability. Also, the principles of physical and
functional diversity need to be applied to increase the availability and reliability
of the system.
It could even be argued that enough redundant sensors should be placed in
the system to make repairs due to signal processing failure a rare event, since
switching from a failed to a back-up sensor would be sufficient to keep the
operation going after a sensor fails. But, this would probably be unacceptable
for commercial reactors, and functional diversity of sensors, i.e., sensors
measuring the same variable but based on different physical measurement
processes, and cross checking of signals is preferable. However, common mode
failures may still be possible and reduce the reliability of such a system.
2.2.2 The Coil Cooling System
The coil cooling system (ABI) is unavailable when it cannot provide
sufficient cooling for the coil winding or the current leads. The cooling systems
for the coil winding and the current leads are not connected within the
boundaries of the coil cooling system, except by the overall plant cryogenic
cooling system if the same coolant is used, and therefore failure of any of these
systems can lead to the top event independently. Furthermore, the current leads
cooling system fails when its LHe or LN 2 supply system is unavailable.
Failure of any of the cooling systems with a single coolant can then occur
due to a failure of the main coolant supply line, the supply lines to a single
pancake arrangement or a current lead, or due to failure of its regulation and
control system. This observation allows for a modular structure of the fault tree
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for the coils cooling system as it is illustrated in Fig. 2-9. However, while the
fault tree structure for a coolant supply line or a regulation and control system
is the same for each cooling system, the failure rates for the basic failure modes
will depend on the specific device used, e.g., there will be differences in the
failure rates of devices supplying LHe or LN 2 , and due to the location of the
device, i.e., depending on its environment. Therefore, the reliability output for
the top event of each subtree can be different, but the logical combinations of
events leading to the top event will be the same.
Fig. 2-10 shows one of these subtrees, the fault tree with the top event
"unavailability of a single coolant supply line". This top event can occur when
the cooled device is insufficiently supplied with coolant, there is a loss of support
or casing for the coolant distribution or regulation network, or the electrical
insulation of the coolant supply line breaks down. Insufficient coolant supply
can be caused by a loss of coolant flow or a loss of coolant. However, it needs
to be decided which disturbances in the coolant supply are tolerated, e.g.,
whether a "small" leak needs to be repaired immediately or can be tolerated
until the next routine shutdown.
Leaks leading to loss of coolant may occur in regulating devices like valves
and manifolds or in the piping, where welded connections may particularly
contribute to leakages and the quality of manufacturing and assembly becomes
important. The coolant flow can be lost when the cooling pipes are deformed,
e.g., due to sudden excessive loads or when coolant spacers fail structurally, e.g.,
due to fatigue combined with creepage. Furthermore, the coolant lines can be
blocked when coolant impurities accumulate or ice builds up, e.g., water, 02 or
N2. This is most likely at bottlenecks like regulating devices or coolant inlets
and outlets.
Structural failure of the support or casing of the coolant distribution
network can arrive form cyclic thermal and mechanical loads or from sudden
excessive stresses, e.g., unbalanced electromagnetic forces in the case of a
discharge of a single coil. The electrical insulation of the coolant pipes to the
surrounding structure (which may have a different electrical potential) will also
-45-
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be necessary. The NET design uses isolators at the coolant in- and outlets of
each supply line to a single pancake arrangement or a single lead [Bfinde 1987],
as illustrated in Fig. 2-1. A break of the isolator or structural failure of the
connection between isolator and coolant supply line may lead to a failure of the
insulation.
A fault tree for the failure of the control and regulation system of a coolant
supply line is shown in Fig. 2-11. A failure of the regulating device(s) or the
monitoring instrumentation can lead to the top event. The regulating devices
may be passive or active, like only one-time adjusted manifolds or valves, and
there can be several such devices in a single coolant supply line. Passive and
active devices may fail due to miscalibration or wrong initial adjustment, which
can be caused by human error. Also, such devices can experience shifts in the
calibration during operation. For active devices with moving parts, erroneous
movements can lead to failure. Such movements can be caused by mechanical
problems, e.g., wear or increased friction in moving joints during operation,
leading to conditions where no or only limited movement is possible anymore.
Also, signal processing failures, e.g., the misinterpretation of command signals,
may cause erroneous movements.
The cooling system instrumentation can fail when any of the pressure,
temperature, or mass flow rate measurements at the coolant in- or outlet are
unavailable. However, the principle of physical diversity of measurements may
be used here, and the OR-gate in the fault tree may be replaced by a
2-out-of-3 decision logic, i.e., only two of the three measurements are required
for the controller [Biinde 1987]. Each of the sensors could also be designed
redundantly. The fault tree for a single measurement failure is provided in Fig.
2-8.
-48-
Chapter 2: FAILURE ANALYSIS OF MAGNET SYSTEMS
a
J? t
, E _
-~~ 16 '} 2,<]-0 HON 2
I~aII.E
E.5 r-
IIe.:
- aE
L~U.
E co
eE e E
E E
-49-
I
2
CP0gg
U.~
C.,.
0
U a
ai
o~e
* e
Chapter 2: FAILURE ANALYSIS OF MAGNET SYSTEMS
2.2.3 The Power Supply and Control System
The power supply system of the TF coils, which is illustrated in Fig. 2-2,
will become unavailable when a power supply unit or the busbar network fails.
The DC power bus can fail when it is insufficiently cooled, a structural failure
like a wire break occurs, or the insulation fails. The failure modes of a power
supply unit are not broken down further, since they will depend strongly on the
internal electrical layout of the power supply unit, i.e., its thyristors, diodes,
resistors, etc.
The TF protection and control system, for which a fault tree is shown in
Fig. 2-12, has to control the TF coil current during ramp-up, periods of
constant current, and current ramp-down. Therefore, only a single variable
needs to be controlled, which furthermore changes very slowly, and the
breakpoints for coil energization and deenergization arrive from a higher level
controller. Then, the TF coil control system fails when a current control module
becomes unavailable or the communication between the control module and the
power supply is unavailable.
There are also three systems which are safety related and belong to the
protection system. In order to avoid excessive unbalanced forces during coil
quenches, a quench detection module uses information provided by the pancake
instrumentation about the current imbalances in the coil to decide upon the
initiation of mitigating action. This action is likely to be a fast external
discharge of all coils, or at least of those coils that are connected in series
[Dinsmore 1986]. However, the fast external discharge system can be unavailable
due to equipment failure or failure of a protection module.
The equipment consists of the safety discharge switch and a dump resistor.
Its failure modes are hardware failure of the switch dump resistors or of the
signal processing to the switch (fault tree given by Fig. 2-8). Assuming that
the switch has to open on demand (in case of a fast external discharge
command), it can either be stuck open or closed or it may function but vibrate
and cause arcing at its contacts. The dump resistor can fail due to insufficient
cooling and overheating during a fast external discharge, or when a mechanical
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failure leads to an internal short, reducing the resistance of the resistor (since
then the discharge will take longer).
A fast discharge protection module [Dinsmore 1986] then checks the coil
conditions during the discharge and decides upon continuation of the discharge.
It may therefore be useful to install an adjustable resistor instead of a constant
resistor, so that the protection module can adjust the resistor to the coil voltage
and can achieve the best possible current decay or energy removal time. Since a
rheostat may not be practical because of the high discharge currents, such an
adjustable resistor may be made up of a collection of resistors and switches.
The ground fault monitoring system has to sense currents in the neutral
conductor and command the closure of a crowbar switch, by which the coil is
effectively bypassed. Thus, any failure of the crowbar switch or of the current
measurement and signal processing system can lead to outage of the earth fault
monitoring system.
2.2.4 Discussion
2.2.4.1 TF Magnet Failure Analysis
It has been the objective of the failure mode analysis in the previous
sections to give an overview of failure modes of a magnet system in order to
allow to identify areas of particular interest to the designer. It is found, that
the fault trees contain mostly OR-gates at higher level of failures. At lower
levels, several failures (or states of performance degradation) are caused by
continuous combinations of multiple variables. Often, such failures involve cyclic
mechanical loadings of equipment under severe environmental conditions.
Therefore, a lifetime or reliability analysis will be of high importance, and
constant failure rates may not be sufficient to describe the failure behavior
arriving from such effects like irradiation and fatigue.
The environmental conditions are also a major factor for a large number of
failure modes of the instrumentation and signal processing. Also, the logic used
to decide upon control actions on the basis of multiple measurements, the repair
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logic and the maintenance schedule will determine the reliability of the
instrumentation. Manufacturing and assembly tolerances and errors may also
have large impact on the reliability of the magnets. This suggests, that
extensive testing of the coils should be performed prior to their installation in
the fusion device, in order to detect and repair burn-in failures caused by
manufacturing and assembly errors with reduced efforts and costs. This is also
of importance since the impact of human errors in the calibration or limit value
setting for instrumentation and regulating devices can then be reduced.
The failure mode analysis also demonstrates the importance of adequate
cooling of electrical equipment that can be heated during operation (e.g., by AC
losses). Furthermore, these effects show the importance of an interactions
analysis, since failures of electrical equipment may be related to those of the
cooling system, or more importantly, mechanical loads on TF coil structures can
stem from the operation of the PF coils. The latter effect will be further
analyzed in Chapter 2.3.
In summary, the qualitative failure analysis of previous sections provides an
assessment of potential sources of failures in a magnet system. It can now be
used as the basis for a quantitative, i.e., risk and reliability analysis, which
evaluates the contributions of single failure modes to the reliability of the entire
system.
2.2.4.2 Differences between the TF and the PF System
The previous failure mode analysis has primarily dealt with a
superconducting TF magnet system. In the following paragraphs, the basic
differences between the TF and PF systems are discussed, assuming that the PF
coil system can feature superconducting and resistive coils.
PF coils may experience significant bending stresses during operation. Part
of these stresses arrive from the interaction of the PF coil currents with the
fringe field of the TF coils. More significant bending stresses may be introduced
by the discrete vertical supports of the PF coils, and possibly lead connections
when they lead to radial or vertical constraints on the PF coils. Also, the
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pulsed operation of PF coils may generate higher heating losses in the coils than
for the TF coils. In addition, some PF coils (in particular outer PF coils) have
very long turns, leading to long coolant channels. Therefore, it might be
necessary to divide the coils into separately cooled sections (particularly for
superconducting coils) in order to keep the temperature rise between coolant inlet
and outlet within the desired range. However, the larger number of coolant
connections per pancake in such a design can contribute to a higher failure rate
due to failure of coolant pipe connections.
Separately powered coil sections have also been proposed, mainly for internal
PF coils [Salpietro 1988], for reasons of maintenance and repair access. However,
additional leads are required for this arrangement. The IC coils are also
particularly close to the area of fluence production, and require heat and
radiation resistant materials. The IC coils will furthermore be heavily loaded
under disruptions (mainly compressive stresses), and the eddy currents during
disruption may exceed the rated coil currents. Therefore, redundant coils may
be required to achieve high reliability of the IC coils.
Space limitations on the stack of central solenoid PF coils may furthermore
require high current densities. Therefore, a degradation of the insulation or the
current carrying capability of the conductor may become of particular concern for
this group of PF coils.
For reasons of symmetry, external PF coils below and above the midplane
are connected in series. The electrical connections between both coils add a
potential for shorts to power or ground, failure of their cooling equipment, and
mechanical failure of the electrical connections to the coils and of the
encapsulation structure. Furthermore, the lead placement for the central solenoid
PF coils is very tight since the leads are designed coaxially to reduce magnetic
field errors. Clearly, this results in an increased danger of shorts between coil
terminals due to displacement caused by mechanical loads or breakdown of the
insolation between leads.
The support structure for the central solenoid stack has to avoid contact
with the central support structure of the TF coils. But it may also be required
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to avoid vertical loads of the central solenoid coils on each other, and to
support repulsive loads on the upper and lower coils. Failure to provide this
support could lead to significant consequences for conductor reliability. The
support structure can fail due to its cyclic thermal and mechanical loading or
under excessive loads caused by disruptions or quenches (or external events, like
earthquakes). It is furthermore subject to irradiation. However, because of the
shielding effect of the TF coil structure, the level of irradiation will be reduced
for the PF coils compared to the TF coils.
The electrical and control system for the PF magnets is significantly
different from that of TF magnets, and will be described in detail in Chapter
3.1. The self- and mutual inductances of the coils vary with their locations, and
each coil need to be considered separately in the electrical analysis. In
particular, the design of safety discharge resistors needs to be adapted to each
coil's circuit.
A mixture of superconducting and resistive coils may be used for the
external PF coil system A CA. For instance, the resistive coils could be located
to shield the superconducting coils against field changes and irradiation.
Furthermore, they may be operated during phases of the pulse of particularly
high loads on external PF coils. Thereby, the loads on the superconducting coils
may be reduced during these phases. Otherwise, this may require very different
current scenarios for superconducting and resistive coils, and make electrically
independent circuits for super- and normalconducting coils necessary [Salpietro
1988].
Normalconducting coils may be able to support in plane forces without
conduit support, but laminate structures may have to be used [Thome 1988] and
the laminate bond strength becomes of particular importance. Resistive coils will
also be ohmically heated during a pulse (possibly even adiabatically [Thome
1988]), and the combined effect of cyclic thermal and mechanical loads under
irradiation and ohmic heating needs to be considered. Also, the strength
behavior of the conductor at low operating temperatures, e.g., the temperature of
LN 2 , may become a concern. Furthermore, the cooling process may become
discontinuous, since most of the cooling is performed between pulses.
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2.3 Interactions Analysis for the PF Magnet System
As has already been discussed in previous sections, the PF Magnet System
has to initiate and induce the plasma current and to control the position and
shape of the plasma. This requires a characteristic PF coil operation scenario,
where each coil pair follows a different current scenario in a pulsed operation
mode. It distinguishes the operation of the PF coils strongly from that of the
TF coils. Therefore, interactions within the PF magnet system and with other
reactor subsystems, which are caused by the PF magnet system can be divided
into two groups. There are interactions occurring due to the operation of
magnet systems in general, e.g., interactions via the cooling system, and
interactions which are caused by the characteristic operation of the PF coils and
are thus unique for the PF magnet system.
In general, there are six basic mechanisms by which the PF magnet system
can interact with other systems:
1. Electromagnetic interaction, e.g., via eddy currents induced in the
surrounding structures or electromagnetic (Lorentz) forces due to the
interaction of magnetic fields with current carrying structures or wires;
2. Mechanical interaction, i.e., the application of direct mechanical stresses
or forces, e.g., via a common support structure or broken parts during a
failure;
3. Interaction by thermal coupling, i.e., direct or indirect heat transfer
between magnets and surrounding equipment or other coils, e.g., via
common cooling media and structures;
4. Electrical interaction, i.e., interactions via electrical connections, not by
induced currents, e.g., resulting from undesired intermittent connections
or electrical coupling via busbars;
5. Plasma interactions, i.e., interactions which lead to forces, currents, etc.,
resulting from the behavior of the plasma, e.g., plasma disruptions; and
6. Control interactions, which are caused by control instruments or
operators, e.g., wrong indication of a failure situation, or human errors.
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A useful tool for visualizing the large number of interactions that can be
caused by the PF magnet system, is found to be an Interaction Matrix. Such
an Interaction Matrix includes interactions occurring during normal operation and
under fault conditions. It is a straightforward extension of the concept of a
Fault Interaction Matrix which was suggested by Piet [Piet 19861 and later
applied to a loss of mission analysis for CIT [Cadwallader 1987], but has also
been used in other contexts (see, for example [Garrick 1984]).
An Interaction Matrix for the PF magnet system is shown in Table 2-1. It
describes the impacts and types of interactions caused by the four main PF
magnet subsystems in the left column on each of the reactor subsystems in the
top row. Most matrix elements contain one or multiple potential interaction
processes, which shows the large amount of coupling introduced into the reactor
by the PF magnet system. Most of the coupling is due to the characteristic
operation of the PF magnets, either directly e.g., by the effect of changing
magnetic fields, or indirectly, e.g., by the large number of control actions and
the strong impact and reliance on feedback information from the plasma. Some
of the main effects resulting from this group of interactions are discussed in the
following paragraph.
Within the PF magnet system, the coils may induce currents in each other
which can cause additional heating of the coils and may even lead to quenches
in superconducting coils under certain failure conditions. The changing magnetic
PF fields also lead to cyclic forces on the PF coils, in vertical and radial
direction. These magnetic fields produce out-of-plane forces on the TF coils by
interaction with the TF coil currents. When the magnetic fields above and
below the midplane are symmetric, the out-of-plane forces and the torque (about
the torus axis) sum up to zero for a complete TF coil but still produce an
overturning moment (about the midplane) on the TF coils.
Also, the changing currents in the PF coils interact with the fringe fields
from the TF coils to produce cyclic bending moments on the PF coils.
However, this effect is small because the TF coils generate a magnetic field that
is essentially toroidal. Since some PF coils may be supported by the TF coil
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supports (e.g., the intercoil support structure), loads on the PF coils can also be
transferred to the TF coils. The operation of the PF coils requires a large
number of control actions, which can be influenced by the pulsed magnetic fields
from the PF coils. This may lead to higher failure rates for signal processing or
other sensitive electrical or controlling devices, causing them consequently to
omit control actions or commit undesired actions. Also, devices that are
operated electrically, such as solenoid operated valves, may malfunction.
Therefore, the impact of the magnetic field is somewhat similar to that of an
external event like an earthquake and could thus be regarded as a common mode
failure initiator for a large number of systems [Piet 1986].
The behavior of the plasma depends also heavily on the performance of the
PF coil system. Failure to provide the desired current scenario in the PF coils
may quickly lead to a plasma disruption, where the plasma current decays
abruptly. This may cause heating and mechanical loads on surrounding
structures and the PF and TF magnets. The power supply system for the PF
coils requires high peak power but has to handle high power returns from the
coils during a pulse as well. These power scenarios can lead to strong electrical
coupling with the public grid or other power supplies (e.g., to the TF coils, or
auxiliary supplies) in the fusion device, if no adequate compensation equipment is
provided.
This interaction analysis of the PF magnet system demonstrates the
potential for interactions with a large number of reactor subsystems under
normal operation and fault conditions. This means, that those interactions need
to be considered in the reliability analysis of magnet systems under two aspects:
1. Under conditions of normal operation of the PF coils, the interactions
can contribute to basic failure modes of other reactor subsystems, as it
was already shown for the TF magnet system in Chapter 2.2; and
2. Under fault conditions of the PF magnet systems, the interactions can
lead to consequences in other reactor subsystems and need to be
considered in the fault consequence analysis of the PF magnet system.
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The first aspect contributes to the difficulties involved in quantitative failure
analysis of the magnet system, since time dependent basic failure rates may need
to be considered, and multiple effects like irradiation and cyclic stresses may act
together to cause basic failure modes. This aspect will not be pursued further in
this study.
The second aspect requires further analysis of fault scenarios and the
quantification of fault consequences in order to decide upon the importance of
those effects on the design of the magnet system. This aspect will be discussed
in more detail in Chapter 3.
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CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS OF ELECTRICAL
FAILURES OF THE PF MAGNET SYSTEM
Differences between the TF and the PF magnet systems arise from the
characteristic operation mode of the PF magnets and are mainly reflected in
differences in the electrical and control systems of both magnet systems. For
the PF magnets, these systems will be significantly more complex since more
operating parameters need to be controlled in a tight time frame. Therefore, the
electrical and control system of the PF magnets is selected for further study,
and electrical failures of the PF magnet system will be examined in this
Chapter. In the first part, the features of an electrical and control system for
the PF magnets, as it might look in future devices, are examined. Then, a
specific design, that of the CIT machine, is chosen as a basis for the selection of
specific fault scenarios. The consequences of an exemplary class of failures on
the PF magnet system itself and on other reactor subsystems, caused by
interactions as discussed in Chapter 2.3, are investigated for several selected fault
scenarios. Part of the results have been reported in [Zimmermann 1988].
3.1 The Electrical and Control System of the PF Magnets
The electrical and control system of the PF magnets needs to fulfill two
basic tasks: (1) to provide the predesigned voltages and currents at the coil
terminals; and (2) to allow for fast corrections of these voltages and currents
depending on the state of the plasma. In order to accomplish these tasks,
designs for devices like CIT or NET include PF coils external and internal to
the TF coils. The external PF coils will be operated in a current control mode
following a preprogrammed current scenario, and will adapt only slowly, on a
timescale of a few seconds to changes of the state of the plasma. Considering the
large inductances of the external PF coils and taking the shielding effect of the
structures between these coils and the plasma into account, fast control of these
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coils would require the capability for fast and large changes of coil voltages.
This would require high voltage power supplies, which would have to deliver
unrealistically large amounts of electrical power. Therefore, the fast control on a
timescale of a few milliseconds is performed by the internal PF (IC) coils, since
they are located very closely to the plasma and allow for fast changes of the
magnetic field while requiring significantly less power than would be needed for
fast control of the external PF coils. However, unlike the TF coil power supplies,
most of the PF coil supplies still need to provide high current ramp rates and
bidirectional currents and coil voltages due to the pulsed mode of operation.
For fusion devices like NET and CIT the public grid may therefore not be
used as the only power source, and storage capabilities for mechanical energy like
motor flywheel generators will be required. Both power sources may then feed
their power into a possibly redundant busbar, which connects all PF power
supply units. In order to correct the power factor and compensate for reactive
power, capacitor banks will be connected to the busbar. Furthermore, load
breaking equipment for fast connection of the busbar to ground, and standby
power equipment (e.g., a diesel generator) may be installed.t
The PF coil power supplies are connected to the busbar by load breaking
switches. Since each coil follows a different current scenario, each pair of external
coils above and below the midplane and each of the IC coils is likely to be
powered independently. Such an arrangement has been proposed for CIT [CIT
1988] and NET [Hicks 1986], and avoids a switching network between coils, while
its economical disadvantages seem to be acceptable when compared to an
integrated power supply scheme.J
Each of the coil power supply units may consist of a network of
unidirectional power supply modules. A switching network between these
t The information about the PF power supply system of NET was obtained from a personal
communication with R. Bunde, The NET Team, Garching, West Germany, in April 1988. For
CIT, this information was obtained from [CIT 1988].
1 Personal Communications with J.H. Schultz, MIT Plasma Fusion Center, August 1988.
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modules and the coil terminals will be required to obtain the desired output
voltage at the current leads. Such a system is illustrated in Fig. 3-1.
Each power supply unit has its own local control and protection module,
which conditions all signals needed for controlling the output voltage. It
furthermore provides status information for the higher level control system. The
power supply unit is protected against overcurrents and -voltages by a protection
network, which is likely to be passive. A ground fault monitoring system senses
currents in the neutral conductor. In case of a ground fault, a crowbar switch
is closed by which the coil is effectively bypassed. The desired timing of the
reaction scenario may depend on the current state of the PF coil power supplies
in order to keep the loads on the external power supply small [Bertolini 1987].
The switching network between a power supply unit and the current leads
makes the final modulation of the output voltage during the pulse. It contains
an arrangement of reverse-make switches which are used for changing the
direction of the output current. Furthermore, a circuit breaker unit will be
installed. Such a unit essentially consists of a circuit breaker and a resistor in a
parallel arrangement. Therefore, when the circuit breaker is closed, the effect of
the resistor on the output voltage is very small. However, when the circuit
breaker opens, the coil current will be redirected through the resistor, causing a
sudden voltage drop at the coil terminals and leading to a high current ramp
rate in the coil. Therefore, the circuit breaker may be used for two tasks: (1)
to provide most of the fast voltage drop at the coil terminals which is required
to create the loop voltage necessary for plasma initiation [Bertolini 1987,
Salpietro 1988]. This also leads to reduced requirements for the power supply
modules; and (2) the circuit breaker-resistor arrangement can be used to deposit
energy during the pulse, which will reduce the amount of reactive power that is
fed back into the busbar when the coils are deenergized. This may thereby
compensate for part of the power changes during a pulse.
Therefore, the circuit-breaker network needs to be capable of breaking high
currents, and additional protection equipment will be required to achieve reliable
and safe operation. There are two basic paths to protect this equipment, that is
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to open the circuit breaker only when it carries no current, or to close the
circuit breaker again when it is vibrating and arcing. This can be achieved by
providing an artificial zero of the current during switching, where an arrangement
of a precharged capacitor and a saturable inductance can be used to compensate
for the current through the circuit breaker. Furthermore, a combination of a
damping resistor and a bypass switch may be used to dampen vibrations of the
circuit breaker and extinguish arcs between its open contacts [Bertolini 1987].
The reliability of the described part of the PF power supply and control
system already depends to a high degree on the reliability of the signal
processing, control commands, and the fulfillment of time requirements in the
system. However, this part of the system still does not take the state of the
plasma into account and is essentially an open loop controller.
The feedback information from the plasma is needed for plasma control and
protection and is used by two basic systems, the plasma protection and current
control system (PPCC), and the coil and plasma safety protection system. This
is illustrated in Fig. 3-2.
Information about the state of the plasma is provided by a plasma
diagnostics system, which yields signals for the magnetic field, the magnetic flux,
the plasma current, the current density, and monitors runaway electrons in the
plasma. The variables that need to be controlled are the vertical and radial
position of the plasma, the plasma shape, and the plasma current. This control
is accomplished by separate control modules for each of the control variables,
and the control signals are transformed into corrective coil output voltages and
sent to the local power supply unit controllers. However, the reference profiles
for the control variables representing the waveform information of the coil
currents and the waveform breakpoints for the coil current scenarios, are
provided for each control module from a high level control system. These
waveforms may be set by operator action or actions of safety systems and may
be unchanged during operation [Bertolini 1987, Dinsmore 1986]. They may also
be varied in response to the state of the plasma on a slow timescale of a few
seconds.
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The coil and plasma safety protection system comprises the fast external
discharge and quench detection system for the TF coils, but also a system for
the detection of plasma fault conditions and for the soft termination of a pulse.
The soft or orderly termination of a pulse is provided by a pulse termination
network (PTN), when dangerous or undesirable plasma conditions arrive, such as
consistently undesirable values of measured variables or plasma disruptions.
Undesirable plasma conditions are monitored by modules for disruption detection
and detection of faltering plasma breakdowns, and are transferred to the plasma
fault protection system, which decides upon altering control modes in the PPCC
or issuing a signal to the PTN module for a soft termination of the pulse [How
1986].
However, the plasma fault protection system will also communicate with the
auxiliary plasma heating (e.g., RF heating or neutral beam injection) and the
fueling system, which contribute to the control of plasma temperature and
current density [How 1986].
Potential actions taken by the PTN comprise switching off the auxiliary
heating power, removing the power from the PF power supply system, and
controlling the plasma current to zero. It is desired to perform the last two
actions very smoothly within a few seconds, in order to protect the power
generators and supplies, and to reduce the loads resulting from a decay of the
plasma current. However, such a procedure may also fail in some cases and lead
to a plasma disruption [How 1986].
In summary, the PF power supply and control system is an internally highly
coupled system which has to control multiple coupled variables on a fast time
scale. This implies a complexity that can be expected to lead to a large
potential for fault initiation in this system.
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3.2 Electrical Failures of the PF Magnet System
For the PF magnet system, it is required that the reference profiles for the
coil currents can be followed, and disturbances can be quickly controlled in order
to fulfill its tasks properly and safely. Therefore, any failures leading directly to
undesirable or dangerous coil current profiles will be of high importance, and
such electrical failures will be examined in this section.
Electrical failures can arise from failures in the coil winding or at the
current leads, and virtually all faults initiated in the PF power supply and
control system are electrical failures. Failures of the first type are discussed in
Chapter 2.2 and arrive mainly from mechanical overloads and thermal loads,
combined with the effects of irradiation. Failures of the latter type occur when
the PF power supply system (A CL) or the PF protection and control system
(ACY) fails. The fault trees for these systems are presented in Fig. 3-3 to 3-6.
The PF power supply system will be unavailable when the external power supply
or any of the internal single power supply units is unavailable as illustrated in
Fig. 3-3. In this context, unavailability means that either no or only limited
power can be provided, the desired safety of the power generation or conversion
cannot be achieved, or the output voltage or current scenarios do not agree
sufficiently with the desired output profiles.
The operation of each power supply unit requires much monitoring, and the
availability of signal detection and processing equipment is very important,
within the system as well as for its communication with the remaining power
supply units, as shown in Fig. 3-4. Since the setup of the power supply
modules within a power supply unit may have to be changed during a pulse,
configuration errors arriving from a higher level control system or the operator
can lead to electrical failures. Furthermore, some power supply equipment and
the busbars will need to cooled, and in order to reduce the number of failure
modes, passive air cooling will be preferable but not always possible, e.g., due to
space constraints.
For actuators like trigger devices and switches, wear-out and fatigue failures
are potential major failure modes, and the number of pulses together with the
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Fig. 3-3. System Fault Tree for the PF Magnet Power Supply System
environmental conditions need to be taken into account for their design. Those
actuators are mainly part of the switching and protection network, for which a
fault tree is shown in Fig. 3-5. However, insufficient cooling of equipment and
spurious operation of equipment, possibly caused by interactions with surrounding
equipment, may also contribute to failures of the switching and protection
network to a high degree.
The PF protection and control system fails when any of its subsystems
becomes unavailable, as the fault tree in Fig. 3-6 illustrates. The reliability of
its equipment will depend to a high degree on manufacturing, assembly and
maintenance procedures. The system setup should therefore be as simple as
possible to avoid failures of the protecting and control equipment failures that
overshadow the failures of the equipment to be protected or controlled (e.g., this
has already been observed at TFTR [Greenough 1987]).
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In summary, the fault trees for the PF power supply and control system
show a much larger number of potential failure modes than the comparable
systems for the TF coils (see Chapter 2.2.3). Therefore, results for the failure
analysis of the TF system cannot be directly transferred to the PF system.
Instead, the PF power supply and control system needs to be analyzed
separately.
3.2.1 Reported Electrical Failures of Magnet Systems
The database for failures in fusion magnet systems is not well developed at
the present time. Although a number of large experimental fusion facilities have
already been operating for several years, little failure data has been published so
far. In this section, electrical failures of magnet systems reported in three recent
studies are summarized. These are reports about TFTR [Greenough 1987], JET
[Huart 1986], and a survey of failures [Thome 1986] in the U.S. This analysis
yields some insight into the quantification of the contribution of single failure
modes to system failures. However, the database is too small to be
representative for the entire system. Table 3-1 contains a partial list of failures
that were reported in the aforementioned studies, and some general aspects of
this data will be emphasized in the following paragraphs.
The large number of control devices and actions in the system contribute to
a high degree to electrical failures. This was particularly emphasized in the JET
study [Huart 1986]. For the switching network, the flywheel generators, and the
power supplies, control and command and alarm monitoring failures made the
largest contribution. It was suggested that only careful selection of components,
control of the manufacturing process, and extensive testing before start of
operation could reduce these faults.
For TFTR and JET, the protection logic and fault detection system was
identified as another strong contributor to failures. The number of protective
devices should be minimized, since a sophisticated detection and protection
system was found to experience frequent failures, often attributed to
uncontrollable shifts in calibration of monitoring equipment during operation.
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Ref. Failure Event Potential Cause of Failure
Failure of Coil or Current Leads
3 overcurrent in lead na
3 internal short sensor lead-coil mechanical overload, design of sensor lead
3 turn-to-turn short in coil mechanical abrasion of insulation
3 lead short to ground inadequate support
3 ground short of coil inclusion in insulating material
3 overvoltage and turn-to-turn short mechanical overload
3 overheating and arcing of coil inadequate coil cooling
Failure of Power Supply and Control System
1 control board (for communication) failure vibrations (?)
1 misoperation during shutdown scenario disturbed signal processing
due to electrical noise
1 spurious operation of fault detector miscellaneous causes, design complexity
1 failure of reaction scenario for control
power outage poor implementation of reaction scenario
2 cooling system outage sensitivity to foreign materials
2 control and command failure(s) miscellaneous causes, complexity
of control system
2 alarm monitoring failure na
2 failure of protection logic na
3 overcurrent at leads (and burnout) miswired power supply
3 rectifier failure electrical noise
Failure of Switching and Protection Svttem for Power Supplies
1 mechanical failure of reverse make switch(es) fatigue
1 failure of crowbar switch environmental conditious
1 failure of air valve in cooling system
for electrical equipment complex electrical operation
1 mechanical failure of switches in circuit
breaker arrangement fatigue
2 loss of control over circuit breaker na
2 fracture of reverse make switches fatigue
2 spurious intervention of protection logic na
2 outage of cooling system sensistivity to dirt
2 failure of alarm monitoring na
2 control and command failure(s) na
3 excitement of coil in field opposing direction na
3 short in magnet insulation failure of dump resistor
3 overheating of dump resistor inadequate cooling
3 overcurrent at coil programming error in control logic
3 uncontrolled rise of power supply voltage defective software algorithm
na: not available
References: 1: [Greenough 1987]; 2: [Huart 19861; 3: [Thome 1986
Table 3-1. List of Reported Electrical Failures of Magnet Systems
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Furthermore, a number of early wear-out failures of switches and circuit breakers
were reported, as well as switch failures caused by the effect of environmental
conditions. Similarly, the operation of the cooling system was found to be
sensitive to foreign materials in a number of cases.
Some of the failures reported by Thome, et. al., [Thome 1986] seemed to
cause more severe consequences than those reported from operating experience at
JET or TFTR. This suggests, that a large number of failures with little
consequences and short downtimes may not have been reported. However,
configuration errors in the power supply, and failures of the switching networks
still appeared on the list of failures, together with a number of failures in the
coil winding or at the current leads. Considerable damage to the magnet system
was reported for several of these cases. This furthermore demonstrates that a
fault consequence analysis of electrical failures of the PF magnet system must
consider failures of the winding, the leads, and the power supply and control
system.
In summary, there is a large potential for electrical failures in the PF
magnet system, but the complexity of the system and the lack of reliability data
currently does not allow for a determination of all failure modes that could
possibly occur in such a system. Furthermore, such a list of failure modes if it
existed would be very design specific. However, all such failures will cause
consequences for the voltage and current profiles in the coils. Therefore, the
analysis of current and voltage fault scenarios in the coils can be used as the
first step to estimate the consequences, and evaluate the risks associated with
such failures.
Those potential electrical failures can be grouped into two basic categories:
1. Electrical shorts of a coil pair or a single PF coil; and
2. Erroneous control switching, leading to undesired voltages at the coil
terminals.
For a fault consequence analysis, specific fault scenarios need then to be
chosen from these two failure categories, for a specific PF coil arrangement and
current scenario.
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3.3 Selection of Fault Scenarios
This section describes the process adopted for the selection of fault scenarios
in the PF magnet system. This selection is made for a specific magnet design,
the CIT machine, in order to prepare fault scenarios that are then simulated
using a simplified electromagnetic model of CIT. CIT provides a good reference
design, since its PF magnet arrangement and operation scenario is very similar
to expected future experimental machines, like NET or ITER, and the results of
these simulations are then related to those machines. The types of consequences
of particular interest during the fault scenario selection process are the loads on
the external PF and the TF coils, and the temperatures in the external PF
coils.
3.3.1 The Reference Design: CIT 2.1m Machine
CIT is considered as a next major step in the US magnetic confinement
fusion program to demonstrate the technical feasibility of fusion by achieving
conditions better than breakeven, and operating in an ignited plasma regime.
The CIT machine is rather compact with a major radius of 2.1m and a high
field of 11T at the magnetic axis, which is at a radius of 2.1m. A cross section
of CIT is shown in Fig. 3-7. The CIT machine features 7 sets of external PF
coil pairs, PF1 to PF7, and 3 pairs of internal coils, IC1 to IC3. The external
PF coils below and above the midplane will be connected in series, while the IC
coils will probably be operated independently. All coils are resistive and made
of copper or copper-St 718 laminate. They are cooled by LN 2 between pulses.
All external coils contribute to the induction of the plasma current, whose
maximum is 11MA, by providing the required flux swing, which is approximately
54Vs from the beginning until the end of pulse [Pillsbury 1988].
A single complete current pulse of CIT takes 28s, where the first 6.2s are
used to premagnetize the external coils. Then the voltage blip for plasma
buildup occurs, the plasma current is ramped up linearly to 11MA within 7.5s
and held at its maximum for 5s. At the end of plasma current flattop (EOFT),
the plasma current is ramped down linearly within 7.5s, and during the final 2s
of the pulse, the PF coil currents are brought to zero. This scenario can be
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Fig. 3-7. Elevation View of One Section of the CIT 2.1m Machine [Thome 1988]
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Fig. 3-8. Current Scenario for the Plasma and
(Data from (Pillsbury 19881)
the External PF Coil
achieved by the current scenario in Fig. 3-8 for the external PF coils, where
corresponding coils above and below the midplane carry the same currents. The
highest ampere turnst are in the range of 15MA for coils PF1 and PF3 at
plasma initiation at 6.2s and at EOFT at about 19s.
These current and voltage scenarios have been chosen to keep the voltage
requirements at plasma initiation small, and to provide approximately the same
stress level in the central solenoid coils PF1 to Pf3 at plasma initiation and at
EOFT when the highest loads occur. The temperature in the external PF coils
t Ampere turns is the expression used for the total coil current, which is the sum of the currents
in all turns of a single coil.
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rises steadily during a pulse, since the resistive coils heat up almost adiabatically
(Thome 1988]. For CIT, it is desired to keep the temperature of all PF coils
below 330K during a pulse, since higher temperatures might lead to severe
degradation of the insulation. The coils are then cooled down to LN 2
temperature between pulses. A more detailed description of the current, voltage,
stress and temperature scenario for CIT can be found in [Pillsbury 1988], and a
summary is given in Appendix B.
The TF coil current that is needed in CIT to obtain a magnetic field of
11 T at the magnetic axis can be approximated by Eq. 1.2, by setting Bo = 11 T
at Ro = 2.1m. Then, the total ampere turns-coils are
NITF = r BoRo
= 115MA - turn - coils (3.1)
where N is the total number of TF coils and ITF the ampere turns in a single
TF coil. CIT will have 16 TF coils, so that a single coil would carry an
ampere turn product ITF of
ITF = 5.775MA (3.2)
The voltage requirements for the PF coil power supplies can be estimated
by using the voltage per turn data given in Appendix B. Assuming that the
coil voltages are entirely provided by the power supply, the maximum voltage
per coil UPF is given by
UPF =NPFU, i = '7 (3.3)
where U is the maximum voltage per turn of a PF coil, and NPF is the number
of turns. Performing this calculation for each external PF coil, the results of
Table 3-2 are obtained. Since each power supply unit consists of several
unidirectional power supply modules and the coil voltage and current
requirements are fulfilled by connecting several of these units in series or in
parallel, the total available power supply voltage may be different from the
maximum required power supply voltage. Assuming that power supply modules
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are used which are capable of providing 1kV and 20kA, which is under discussion
for CITt, the coil power supply units could provide the total voltages shown in
the last column of Table 3-2. Since all external PF coils require positive and
negative voltages during a pulse, all power supplies need to provide these
voltages bidirectionally.
The internal coils IC1 to IC3 do not contribute significantly to the
breakdown voltage at plasma initiation and are only used for corrections in the
plasma parameters when the plasma current is on. The maximum currents in
these coils are expected to be on the order of 400kA.
3.3.2 The Fault Scenarios
This section describes the final selection process for the fault scenarios for
CIT and gives a list of the investigated fault scenarios. At the present time
little is known about the power supplies and the operation scenarios for the IC
coils. Hence, this study focuses on failures initiated in the electrical system of
the external PF coils. However, several fault scenarios are examined for the
following two limit cases for the terminal constraints at the IC coils:
1. The IC coils are completely passive, i.e., they carry no driven currents
but eddy currents and are treated like shorted coils; and
2. The IC coils carry no current, as would be the case when the IC coil
currents were forced to be zero by the control system.
For all fault scenarios, it is assumed that the currents rather than the
voltages of the external PF coils are controlled. This means that the currents in
the controlled or driven coils are undisturbed by any eddy currents which may
result from changes of the magnetic fields. However, this approach is different
from that in earlier fault analysis studies, like for TFTR [Pelovitz 1986] or
INTOR [INTOR 1982a], where coil current enhancement factors were analyzed
and voltage control was assumed. But it reflects one of the proposed control
t Personal communication with R.D. Pillsbury, Jr., MIT Plasma Fusion Center, May 1988.
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strategies for CIT. Therefore, in this analysis, the loads on the PF and the TF
coils are examined, along with the temperatures of the external PF coils. Since
the temperature in a PF coil depends basically on the integral of Pt during a
pulse, where I(t) is the coil current and t the time, and the currents in the
unfaulted coils are controlled, only the temperatures in faulted coils will differ
from the temperatures under normal operating conditions.
From the two basic categories of faults derived in Chapter 3.2, only one
type of fault per category that is a candidate case for particularly high loads on
the PF and TF coils, is examined. These failures are
1. Shorts between the terminals of external PF coils, since they may
involve larger changes in coil voltage and coil currents than
turn-to-turn shorts or shorts to ground; and
2. The application of a constant voltage at the terminals of external PF
coils, where either the applied voltage at the time of fault initiation is
held constant, or the full available voltage is applied.
Here, effects like sudden temporary voltage drops due to the introduction of
an additional resistance in the circuit or a mismatch during switching scenarios
are not considered. Such effects may lead to nonlinear voltage distributions
along the coil due to capacitive effects and require detailed knowledge of the
design which is beyond the scope of this study.
The stresses and temperatures in the external PF coils (as discussed in
Chapter 3.2 and Appendix B) and the effect of plasma reactions are used to
decide upon the time of fault initiation and which coils are faulted. The coil
stresses are particularly large during plasma initiation and at EOFT. The coil
temperatures are rising steadily during a pulse, so that a fault initiated during
the last phase of a pulse is more likely to lead to temperature problems than
when it is initiated earlier. Furthermore, any major disturbance of the PF coil
currents is likely to be followed by a plasma disruption. Thus, it can be
expected that the higher the plasma current at fault initiation, the more severe
will be the loads on the PF and TF coils caused by the plasma disruption.
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Therefore, faults starting at EOFT and at the end of plasma current (EOPC)
are investigated.
Three types of plasma disruptions are examined, which are fairly typical for
tokamak reactors, but the dynamics for cases 2 and 3 have been obtained
specifically for CIT using a very detailed model, the Tokamak simulation code
(TSC), which is used particularly for disruption and control scenarios analysis.t
The disruption scenarios are:
1. A stationary disruption, where the plasma current decays from initially
11MA to zero within 1rms at a linear rate of -1MA/ms, while the
plasma remains at the magnetic axis. This type of disruption is used
as a standard type throughout this analysis and the current decay rate
is relatively high but may be typical for tokamaks of this size;
2. A horizontal disruption, where the plasma moves radially inward by
about 40cm starting at the magnetic axis and the initial plasma current
is 11MA and reduced to zero within about 5ms; and
3. A vertical disruption, where the plasma current is reduced from 11MA
to zero within 210ms while the plasma moves radially outwards first
and then downwards and inwards.
The dynamics of these disruption scenarios are described in more detail in
Appendix C.
For most of the examined fault scenarios, it is assumed that the fault
remains undetected and no mitigating actions are taken. However, a fault may
be detected after a certain detection time and mitigating actions may be
initiated. Those reaction scenarios could be imagined to be very complicated, in
that one tries to minimize the loads on the PF and TF coils by controlling the
currents in the unfaulted PF coils in a coordinated fashion. But such
sophisticated scenarios might not be robust enough, and may cause additional
t The data has been obtained from cases 0406b and 0516d from R.O. Sayer at the Fusion
Engineering Design Center (internal reference FEDC-L-88-PE-0351, 1988).
-84-
Chapter 3: CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS OF ELETRICAL FAILURES
reliability concerns. However, although such scenarios are not examined in this
study, they might be appropriate under special circumstances when simpler
scenarios cannot avoid high loads on the coils, and should be investigated in
future studies.
Two simple potential mitigating actions are examined in this study:
1. To drive the coil currents in the unfaulted external PF coils to zero on
detection of a coil failure; and
2. To decouple all coils from their power supplies and switch a dump
resistor in each circuit, i.e., the currents in all external PF coils decay,
and the energy of the unfaulted coils is deposited in their respective
dump resistors.
It is assumed that an appropriate detection system yields a detection time
of 2s or less. The dump resistor needs to be chosen to keep the discharge coil
voltages below the insulation rating, which can be assumed to be about 20kV as
suggested for NET [Salpietro 1988]. Furuhermore, assuming that the current
decay time of a coil is on the order of 10s, (from the simulation results decay
times of 3s to 15s could be estimated for CIT) and may be reduced to about
$1s$ by introduction of a dump resistor, the coil currents are reduced to zero
within approximately 3s after the initiation of the discharge. Also, a current
rampdown within is can be imagined for mitigating actions of the first type.
Then, the detection of a fault can be modeled by a single conservative scenario,
where the fault is detected 2s after fault initiation, and the currents in the
unfaulted coils are removed within the following 1s. This scenario is used two
times in this study to evaluate the potential effect of mitigating actions.
As an example of how the final scenario selection process was performed,
some examples will be discussed in the following. In general, all fault scenarios
involving short circuits are started at the EOFT since then coil currents are high
and the plasma still carries its full current of 11MA so that a disruption will be
most severe. It can be expected that the consequences of shorts in multiple
coils will be worse than single coil shorts, in particular when those coils are
located closely together. Therefore, in order to get an estimate for the
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differences in the consequences of coil shorts of central solenoid coils and outer
PF coils, shorts of the entire stack of central solenoid coils, PF1 to PF3, and of
all outer coils, PF4 to PF7, are examined. In another case, a short in PF1 is
chosen because the current in PF1 is highest for all coils at EOFT, and the coil
temperature has reached 250K and is still rising. Also, the average axial and
hoop stresses are very high for coil PF1 at EOFT (see Appendix B). The
question is whether the driving currents in the neighboring coils of PF1 allow for
a quick reduction of the coil current to avoid any temperature problems or
whether the coupling and high inductance of PF1 causes a slow current decay in
PF1. Such a slow current decay would also lead to a slow decay of the forces
on PF1, and in turn possibly lead to higher forces on PF2 and PF3. It may
also yield a change in the magnetic field along the inner leg of the TF coils and
cause higher than normal out-of-plane forces. This fault scenario is examined
with and without mitigating action.
Similar to the last case, a short in PF2 is chosen to investigate the effect
on PF1 and PF2 when PF2 is completely passive and mainly driven by PF1 and
PF3, which have large inductances and carry high currerits at EOFT. In this
case, the coil temperatures in PF2 are of no concern, but the forces on the
remaining central solenoid coils and the TF coils may become a concern and are
therefore evaluated.
Scenarios with asymmetric coil shorts are also examined. Then, only one of
the corresponding external PF coils below and above the midplane is faulted.
Central solenoid coils are major candidates for such failures since their leads are
located in the compact central support structure and are designed coaxially to
reduce the error from the magnetic stray field. Therefore, and for reasons
mentioned in the last paragraph, asymmetric faults are investigated for the lower
coil PF2. These cases are furthermore combined with horizontal and vertical
disruption scenarios where the plasma moves inward and downward, towards the
central PF coil stack and the lower PF2 coil in particular.
For the scenarios with voltage driven coils, faults of PF1 and PF3 are
generally important because of their high temperatures (above 250K) during the
last phase of the pulse. Scenarios starting at EOFT and EOPC are considered.
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In addition, coils PF4 and PF7 may have high voltage power supplies, as shown
in Table 3-2, and applying the full available voltage at these coils can be
expected to yield fast coil current increases. This can also have a large impact
on the out-of-plane force along the top region and outer leg of the TF coils,
because PF4 and PF7 contribute strongly to the magnetic field in these regions.
One of the questions for these voltage driven cases is whether the coil currents,
temperatures, or loads will first yield problems.
In order to have reference modes that can be compared with the fault
scenarios, and to evaluate the uncertainties embedded in the selection process
and the assumptions about the electrical system of the PF magnets, several
reference cases without coil failures are also examined. The total number of
selected scenarios is 24, and a list of the investigated scenarios is given in Table
3-3. Although these fault scenarios are selected based on the design of CIT,
most of the results of the consequence analysis can be expected to be applicable
to other machines with similar PF coil arrangement as well, since similar coil
current profiles will be required. In the following section, the model and the
simulation method that is used to simulate the selected fault scerarios is
described.
3.3.3 The Model
An axisymmetric model of CIT is used to simulate the selected fault
scenarios listed in Table 3-3. The model contains a representation of the
external and internal PF coils, the support structure for the PF and TF coils,
the vacuum vessel and the plasma. Each element in this two dimensional model
is assumed to be toroidally continuous.
Two versions of this model are used and are illustrated in Fig. 3-9a and b.
In the first model (Ml), Fig. 3-9a, only the part of the cross section above the
midplane is represented and the plasma is modeled as a single coil element at
the magnetic axis. This model corresponds to an arrangement where the
respective elements above and below the midplane are in series, i.e., carry the
same current. Therefore, only symmetric faults can be simulated with this
model, and the plasma is stationary. This model consists of 10 PF coil
elements, 1 plasma element, and 128 passive structure elements, for a total of
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type of fault :ase time description
Fault Scenarios
no fault 0 EO all PF coils driven, plasma rampdown
mirror coil pair shorted 1 EOFT PFI, PF2, PF3 shorted
stationary disruption 2 EOFT PF4, PF5, PF6, PF7 shorted
3 EOFT PF1 shorted
3a EOT PF1 shorted, fault detected after 2s
4 EOFT PF2 shorted
5 EOT PF4 shorted
5a EOT PF4 shorted, fault detected after 2s
6 EOT PF7 shorted
mirror coil pair shorted 7 EOF PF2 shorted
horizontal disruption I
single coil shorted 8 EOF PF2 (lower coil) shorted
horizontal disruption
single coil shorted 9 EOFT PF2 (lower coil) shorted
vertical disruption
constant voltage 10 EOFT PF1, -1.6kV (voltage at EOFT)
11 EOFT PF1, -4kV (full voltage)
12 EOFT PF3, 3kV (full voltage)
13 EOFT PF4, -6kV (full voltage)
14 EOFT PF7, -1.2kV (voltage at EOFT)
15 EOF PF7, -4kV (full voltage)
constant voltage 16 EOPC PF1, 1.9kV (voltage at EOPC)
17 EOPC PF7, 1.3kV (voltage at EOPC)
Reference Scenarios
no coil fault all PF coils driven,
stationary disruption R1 EOFT IC coils shorted
no coil fault R2 EOFT all PF coils driven,
IC coils at zero current
no coil fault R3 BOP all PF coils driven,
IC coils shorted
no coil fault all PF coils driven,
vertical disruption R4 EOT IC coils shorted
constant voltage R5 EOPC PF1, 1.9kV (voltage at EOPC)
__________________ 
___ IC coil currents zero at EOPC
BOP: beginning of pulse, at t=0s
EOFT: end of plasma current flattop, at t=18.76s for CIT
EOPC: end of plasma current, at t=26.26s for CIT
Table 3-3. List of Investigated Scenarios
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139 elements. The second version of the model (M2) allows modeling of
asymmetric currents in elements above and below the midplane since these
elements are electrically independent. Only the top half of the model is shown
in Fig. 3-9b.
Model M2 additionally features a multiple element representation of the
plasma, so that plasma movements can be modeled by switching the currents in
certain plasma elements on or off. This model has the same coil and structural
elements as model M1, but the plasma is now modeled by 14 plasma elements
below and 14 above the midplane, leading to a total number of circuit elements
of 304.
In both versions of the model, a representation of the TF coil is
implemented. As illustrated in Fig. 3-9, the TF coil is approximated by a set
of straight line connections between 14 points for each TF coil half. These
points have been digitized from a drawing of the CIT machine and have been
chosen so that the straight line connections approximately follow the center of
the TF coil of CIT.
3.3.4 Scenario Evaluation Indices
The model described in the previous section can be used to simulate the
selected scenarios. It is desired to evaluate the magnitudes and dynamics of the
loads on the PF and TF coils and the temperatures in the external PF coils.
Therefore, the following indices need to be considered, all in comparison to their
respective values under normal operating conditions:
* The magnitude and distribution of the forces and moments on the PF
and TF coils and their support structure;
" Force reversals which do not occur under normal operating conditions or
are of significantly larger magnitude under fault conditions;
* Time shifts in the occurrence of maximum loads or force reversals; and
* Temperature scenarios of the external PF coils.
The stresses in the PF and TF coils resulting from the force scenarios are
not computed since the conversion from forces to stresses is highly design
dependent.
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(a) Model Version MI with a Total of 139 Elements
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(b) Model Version M2 with a Total of 304 Elements
Fig. 3-9. Electromagnetic Model of CIT
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3.3.5 The Simulation Method
The current scenario for each element in the model will be needed to
evaluate the indices discussed in the previous section. Since the system is
inductively coupled, the currents in each element are obtained by solving the
lumped circuit loop voltage equations,
L + RI = U (3.4)
where (t) is the vector of currents in all elements, L is the inductance and R
the resistance matrix, and _U(t) is the vector of the driving voltages. This
vector _(t) is obtained from the desired current and voltage profiles of the
unfaulted coils. Either piecewise linear current ramps or constant voltages per
coil are used as driving functions for the external PF coilst.
The inductance and resistance matrices are time-invariant and are computed
once for the geometries shown in Fig. 3-9 and a set of element materials and
temperatures. For the PF coils, these temperatures are the maximum
temperatures occurring under normal operating conditions for each coil and are
listed in Appendix D. The structural elements are assumed to be made of
stainless steel and operated at LN 2 temperature, except the vacuum vessel, which
is operated at room temperature.
The initial currents at EOFT in all passive elements and the internal PF
coils are taken as zero for all investigated fault scenarios, and this assumption is
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.4.2.6. The plasma and the external PF
coils carry initial currents corresponding to the plasma and PF coil current
scenario from Fig. 3-8.
Once the current scenario for each element in the model is obtained, the
force influence coefficients for all elements and the field influence coefficients for
the points representing the TF coil are used to compute the forces in radial and
t The computations of the currents in each model element are performed under use of the program
packages SOLDESIGN and NEWEIGEN which have been developed by R.D. Pillsbury, Jr., and
are currently available on the MIT Plasma Fusion Center VAX and on the MFE computer
network.
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vertical direction on the external PF coils and the magnetic field at each point
of the TF coil. Assuming that the TF coil current is constant and held at its
maximum of 5.775MA per coil, as computed in eq. 3.2, the out-of-plane load at
a single point of the TF coil representation is obtained as the Lorentz force
resulting from the interaction of the magnetic field of the toroidally continuous
elements in the model and the TF coil current. In this study, the direction of
the TF coil current at a single point of the TF coil representation is
approximated by the slope of the straight line connecting the two neighboring
points. From the distribution of the out-of-plane forces along the TF coil, the
net out-of-plane force, overturning moment about the radial axis, and torque
about the vertical torus axis can then be obtained.
The temperature profiles in the external PF coils are computed with the
procedure described in Appendix D, which takes the temperature dependence of
the resistivity and heat capacity of the coils into account.
A more detailed description of the entire simulation method is provided in
Append'x D.
3.4 Simulation Results and Evaluation
This section summarizes and evaluates the results that have been obtained
from the simulations of the 24 selected scenarios in Table 3-3.
3.4.1 Temperature Results
For CIT, severe degradation of the coil insulation can occur for temperatures
higher than 330K, which is therefore adopted as the limit temperature for the
external PF coils. In the simulations, this temperature is not reached in any
external PF coil for faults involving shorted coils. In most of these cases, the
current decay in the faulted coil is even faster than under normal operating
conditions, and the temperature stays well under the maximum temperature that
would be reached at the end pulse under the preprogrammed current scenario.
In cases where coils are driven with constant voltages, the adopted limit
temperature will be exceeded in the faulted coil in any case after a certain
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period of time since adiabatic heating of the coil is assumed, and energy is
provided for the coil continuously. However, it takes a minimum of 4s (in case
11) after fault initiation to reach 330K for the considered range of scenarios, and
for most cases the period of time between fault initiation and when 330K is
exceeded is between 6s to 15s. This implies, that temperature problems could
be avoided in the external PF coils when protective actions are taken within 4s
or less from the time of fault initiation.
3.4.2 Analysis of Mechanical Loads on the PF and TF Coils
3.4.2.1 Impact of Load Magnitude and Time
Since the simulations provide the loads on the PF and TF coils as a
function of time, they contain information about the dynamics and the
magnitude of the examined loads. For designing protection schemes and
mitigating actions, the time frame for the occurrence of the maximum loads for
each external PF coil or along the TF coil are most important. For the
structural design of the coils and supports, the magnitude of the loads rather
than their dynamics will be the decisive factor. Therefore, the dynamics of the
mechanical loads on the PF and TF coils is particularly dealt with in Sections
3.4.2.2, 3.4.2.4 and 3.4.2.5, while in the remaining sections in this Chapter the
analysis of the magnitudes of the loads is particularly emphasized.
Since the maximum loads under normal operating conditions will be different
for the different external PF coils or along the TF coil, the loads occurring
under fault conditions can be compared and evaluated best when they are
normalized to the maximum loads under normal operating conditions. This leads
to the concept of a multiplication factor, which is the ratio of the maximum
absolute load under fault conditions to the maximum absolute load under normal
operating conditions for each external PF coil or the TF coil. Assuming that a
safety factor of at least 2 will be implemented in the design for each load,
multiplication factors between zero and two would define an envelope of
allowable forces and moments. Multiplication factors outside this allowable
envelope imply a potential for further fault consequences and -point to design
areas which may require additional efforts.
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In this study, all fault scenarios are initiated at EOFT or EOPC, during
the last phase of the pulse. While the load scenarios under normal operating
conditions may be quite different for external PF coils during the pulse, as the
stress scenarios in Appendix B show, the load conditions at EOFT may still be
considered as the most severe during the pulse. Therefore, the normalizing loads
for the computation of the multiplication factors are all taken as the maximum
absolute loads occurring under normal operating conditions after EOFT during a
pulse. These loads are given in Table 3-4a and 3-4b.
3.4.2.2 Time Frame of the Load Scenarios
Under normal operating conditions, the maximum loads on the PF and TF
coils occur either at EOFT or EOPC. For the examined range of fault scenarios,
maximum loads occur within the first 0.5 to 1 second after fault initiation at
EOFT, or at EOPC. The load dynamics are dominated by the occurrence of a
disruption shortly after fault initiation, and later during the pulse by the driving
currents in the unfaulted external PF coils. The distribution of the coils and
TF coil points which experience their maximum load shortly after EOFT or at
EOPC changes only very little for the different fault scenarios. The type of
plasma disruption is also of minor impact in this regard. Table 3-5 gives an
overview of the times of occurrence of maximum loads for the different external
PF coils, for the points on the TF coil, and for the total forces and moments on
one half of the TF coil. The table contains data for case Ri where no coil is
faulted and a stationary disruption occurs at EOFT.
There are only few exceptions when the maximum loads are observed at
shorter times after fault initiation than in the example shown in Table 3-5. For
scenarios where PF1 is involved (cases 1, 3, 3a, 10 and 16) the maximum of the
total loads on a TF coil half may occur already within the first 1 to 3 seconds
from fault initiation. Also, when a fault is detected and the simulated
mitigating actions are taken (cases 3a, 5a), the maximum loads at the TF coil
points 5 to 7 are reached within 2 to 3 seconds after fault initiation.
The loads on coils PF2 and PF4 may also be reached earlier, i.e., about
0.5s to is after fault initiation when the respective coils are shorted (cases 4 and
5). Furthermore, there are small differences between stationary and horizontal
-94-
Chapter 3: CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS OF ELECTRICAL FAILURES
Maximum Forces on PF Coils
coil radial force (MN/m) vertical force (MN/m)
PF1 71.1 42.0
PF2 21.0 6.6
PF3 30.4 3.3
PF4 1.4 0.7
PF5 0.4 0.2
PF6 0.9 1.3
PF7 4.4 0.4
(a) PF Coil Loads
Maximum Out-of-plane Loads on TF Coils
point/total load point/total load
2 6.6 MN/m 10 6.7 MN/m
3 7.8 MN/rn 11 6.9 MN/m
4 3.8 MN/rn 12 2.7 MN/rn
5 0.95 MN/rn 13 2.0 MN/m
6 0.93 MN/rn Ftot 6.3 MN
7 4.6 MN/rn M,. 15.7 MNrn
8 6.0 MN/m M. 28.1 MNm
9 6.6 MN/rn
(b) TF Coil Loads (Totals on Half TF Coil)
Table 3-4. Maximum Absolute Loads on the PF and TF Coils
under Normal Operating Conditions (Case 0)
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Type of Coil Coil or Point/Net Load Time of Maximum
Load After Fault Initiation
PF Coil PF1, PF2v, PF5, PF6, PF7 0.5.
PF2r, PF3, PF4 7.5.
TF Coil 1 to 4 0.55
5 to 7 7.5s
8 to 13 0.58
F__t, M, Ms 7.5s
v: vertical force only
r: radial force only
Ft.: net out-of-plane force on a TF coil half
M,: overturning moment on half TF coil
M,: torque on half TF coil
Table 3-5. Time Frame for the Maximum Loads on the PF and TF Coils
when no Coil is Faulted under a Stationary Plasma Disruption
(Case R1)
disruptions on one side, and vertical disruptions on the other side when the
lower PF2 coil is shorted, in that the vertical disruption may lead to the
maximum load on coil PF7 within the first second from fault initiation. More
detail on the effect of different disruption scenarios is provided in section 3.4.2.4.
In summary, the loads on the PF coils and at points of the TF coil which
are located closely to the inner or outer leg of the TF coil, tend to reach their
maximum shortly after fault initiation, since these areas are closest to the
disrupting plasma, and the disruption will be the dominant factor during this
period of time. At coils or points located around the top region of the TF coil,
the maximum loads may be obtained significantly later, namely at EOPC, and
the load dynamics are dominated by the driving currents in the unfaulted coils.
-96-
Chapter 3: CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS OF ELETRICAL FAILURES
3.4.2.3 Evaluation of Multiplication Factors
The multiplication factors for all fault scenarios with undetected coil faults
and except for cases 13 and 15, where coil PF4 or PF7 is driven with its full
available voltage, are shown in Figs. 3-10 to 3-12.
In general, the multiplication factors are obtained from load scenarios
between the time of fault initiation and when the first external PF coil exceeds
the adopted limit temperature of 330K.
For all these scenarios, the multiplication factors for the force on the
external PF coils in the radial direction are well within the allowable envelope,
as Fig. 3-10 illustrates. Fig. 3-11 shows that most of the multiplication factors
for the vertical forces lie within a range of 1 to 1.8. Only the vertical forces on
PF2 and PF7 reach factors larger than 2. For PF2, this occurs only when PF1
is driven with its full voltage at EOFT (case 11), since PF1 maintains a high
current of about 14MA in this case, leading to high forces on PF2 whose current
is ramped up at the same time. The vertical force on PF2 is still rising when
PF1 reaches 330K about 4s after fault initiation, and would reach a maximum
twice as high at EOPC if the current in PF1 could still be maintained and no
insulation failure occurred and assuming that no protective action is taken.
The multiplication factor of 4 on PF7 is only obtained when PF7 itself is
driven with its voltage at EOFT (case 14). In all other cases, the factors are
below 2.5. In case 14, the current in PF7 stays at a value of about 4.4MA
which is reached at EOFT. The current ramps in the unfaulted coils lead to a
steady rise of the vertical force multiplication factor on PF7 from 2.4 shortly
after fault initiation to 4 at EOPC. However, it is likely that this
multiplication factor of 4 causes only little or no further consequences since the
maximum vertical force on PF7 in case 14 is compressive, and its absolute value
is of the same order as the vertical force on the neighboring coil PF6 at the
same time.
The multiplication factor in the range of 2 to 2.5 that is found in all other
cases started at EOFT is due to the disruption and is reached within 0.5s after
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Maximum Multiplication Factors
of Radial Forces on PF Colls
-- short scenarios
voltage scenarios
4 allowable envelope
0
3
0
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Fig. 3-10. Maximum Multiplication Factors for the Radial Forces on theExternal PF Coils for Scenarios 1 to 17 (Except Cases 13 and15)
fault initiation, where the stationary disruption tends to cause higher vertical
loads on PF7 than the horizontal or vertical disruptions. This can be attributed
to the fact that the plasma does not move away from coil PF7 during a
stationary disruption and, therefore, maintains a strong impact on the loads on
PF7.
In summary, shorts in general and most of the scenarios with constant coil
voltages, may pose little threat to the PF magnets for the examined range of
scenarios provided that the structure is designed to accommodate load
multiplication factors on the order of two under fault conditions.
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Maximum Multiplication Factors
of Vertical Forces on PF Coils
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Fig. 3-11. Maximum Multiplication Factors for the Vertical Forces on theExternal PF Coils for Scenarios 1 to 17 (Except Cases 13 and15)
A similar result is obtained for the out-of-plane loads along the inner and
outer leg of the TF coil (points 2 to 4 and 7 to 13), which can be seen from
Fig. 3-12. The multiplication factors for these points lie in the range of 1 to
1.8 and are very similar for scenarios involving shorted coils or the application of
a constant coil voltage. Only at the inner corner of the TF coil (points 5 and
6), high multiplication factors of up to 4.4 are obtained. This tendency of high
multiplication factors at the inner corner of the TF coil is found for almost all
examined scenarios, and is particularly strong when PF4 or PF7 are faulted.
This may be attributed to the strong contribution of these coils to the plasma
-99-
Chapter S: CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS OF ELETRICAL FAILURES
Maximum Multiplication Factors
of Out-of-plane Forces on TF Coils
0
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
single TF coli points
0
13 totals
(on half coil)
Maximum Multiplication Factors for the Out-of-Plane Loads onthe TF Coils for Scenarios 1 to 17 (Except Cases 13 and 15);Filled Symbols: Sort Scenarios; Unfilled Symbols: VoltageScenarios
loop voltage and flux swing and their high impact on the shaping and
positioning of the plasma. Combined with their large time constants, this yields
the potential for strong impact on the force distribution along the TF coil.
Faults involving PF1 yield multiplication factors very close to unity at
points 5 and 6, and are thus likely to be of little concern. The same can be
assumed to be valid for coils PF5 and PF6, since the operating currents and
voltages are smaller than for coils PF4 and PF7, as can be seen from Table 3-2.
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Furthermore, coils PF5 and PF6 are relatively far away from the TF coils and
the plasma. This assumes that design margins are multiplicative rather than
additive. In the case of additive design margins, multiplication factors smaller
than two could also lead to further consequences under high absolute loads.
The net out-of-plane loads on a half TF coil resulting from the distribution
of the out-of-plane forces along the TF coil, may reach multiplication factors of
up to 3.2, which is also illustrated in Fig. 3-12. Shorts generally yield smaller
multiplication factors than voltage faults. However, these net forces and
moments should not be of major concern provided that the support structure for
the out-of-plane loads on the TF coils (i.e., the intercoil and central support
structure) is be designed to accommodate significantly higher forces during faults
than under normal operating conditions. For the design of the TF coil itself,
the local effects at the inner corner of the TF coil are seen to be of higher
importance. When one the coils PF4 or PF7 is driven with its full available
voltage the load conditions for the PF and TF coils become most severe. A
summary of multiplication factors for these cases (cases 13 and 15) is given in
Table 3-6. High multiplication factors of forces on the driven coil may be
obtained, and the force increases particularly rapidly. The limit temperature of
330K is reached 6s after fault initiation at EOFT in both cases.
In case 13 the forces at the inner corner of the TF coil may rise rapidly
and lead to more than a tenfold increase over the maximum force under normal
operating conditions, as Table 3-6 shows. This effect also causes multiplication
factors of the net out-of-plane force and overturning moment of 5 and 3.6, while
the maximum torque value changes only little. When PF7 is driven with its
full available voltage, the effect on the forces at the inner corner of the TF coil
is much smaller than when PF4 is driven. However, the forces along the outer
leg of the TF coil are increased in case 15, leading to a torque multiplication
factor of 2.8, which is the highest obtained for all investigated scenarios. The
change in the force distribution along the outer leg of the TF coil also leads to
the high multiplication factors of the net force and overturning moment.
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In general, in both cases 13 and 15, fast fault detection and protective
action taken within 1 or 2s after fault initiation will be required to prevent coil
damage.
An asymmetric short of coil PF2 is examined in case 8, where only the
lower coil PF2 is shortcircuited while the upper coil PF2 is driven with its
preprogrammed current as a horizontal disruption takes place. It is found that
the half of the system with the faulted coil experiences very similar loads on the
PF and TF coils as when a symmetric fault occurs (here case 7). Otherwise,
the unfaulted half of the system yields the same load scenario as if no coil at all
would be faulted. This suggests that an asymmetric coil fault may not lead to
significantly different load multiples on the faulted half of the system than would
occur under symmetric fault conditions. More analysis of asymmetric faults in
other coils will be necessary to confirm this result.
3.4.2.4 The Impact of the Type of Disruption
Several fault scenarios with different types of disruptions are compared,
together with two reference cases, R1 and R4, where no coil is faulted but a
stationary and a vertical disruption occurs, respectively.
It is found that the type of disruption has negligible impact on the loads on
the external PF coils. However, the fact that a disruption occurs is important
during the first 0.5s after fault initiation. This is illustrated by Table 3-7,
where multiplication factors for the loads on the PF and TF coils are given for
a scenario with a stationary disruption.
Furthermore, the load distribution and load magnitudes along the TF coil
are slightly affected by the type of disruption. Mainly the loads at the inner
corner of the TF coil can change, but the magnitude of the changes is found to
be in a range of only 10% to 20% for the examined types of disruptions, with
the higher loads appearing for horizontal or vertical disruptions rather than for
stationary disruptions.
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coil radial direction vertical direction
case 13 case 15 case 13 case 15
PF1 1 1.1 1 1
PF2 0.2 0.5 1.2 1.2
PF3 0.9 1.6 5 0.6
PF4 79 (13)* 1.2 19 (2.8)* 0.5
PF5 1 1.4 1 1.5
PF6 1 1 1 1
PF7 1 2.8 1 13
* after 2s
limit temperature reached after 6s
(a) PF Coil Load Multiplication Factors
TF coil case 13 case 15
point/total
2 1.5 1.5
3 1.5 1.4
4 4 1.4
5 38 (14)* 1.5
6 35 (13)* 3
7 1 1.6
8 1 1.8
9 1 1.6
10 1.1 1.8
11 1.1 2
12 1.7 3
13 1 1
Ft 5 4.2
M, 3.6 3
M2 1.1 2.8
* after 2s
Ft total separating force on half coil
M, overturning moment on half coil
M, torque on half coil
(b) TF Coil Load Multiplication Factors (Totals on Half TF Coil)
Table 3-6. Multiplication Factors for the Loads on the PF and TF Coils for
Cases 13 and 15
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Coil Radial Direction Vertical Direction
PF1 1.2 1
PF2 1 1.2
PF3 1 1
PF4 0.7 0.7
PF5 1 1
PF6 1 1
PF7 1 2.5
(a) PF Coil Load Multiplication Factors
Point/Total Factor Point/Total Factor
2 1.7 10 1.1
3 1.5 11 1.1
4 1.6 12 1.7
5 1.9 13 1
6 0.7 Ftot 1.2
7 1.1 M, 1
8 1 M. 1.1
9 1
Ft0 t: net out-of-plane force on a TF coil half
M,.: overturning moment on half TF coil
M,: torque on half TF coil
(b) TF Coil Load Multiplication Factors (Totals on Half TF Coil)
Table 3-7. Effect of a Stationary Disruption on the Multiplication Factors
for the Loads on the PF and TF Coils
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The differences in the load dynamics are essentially constrained to the first
0.5s from fault initiation, and are primarily caused by the currents induced in
the IC coils by the moving plasma during the disruption. The main difference
arises for a vertical disruption, where the currents in the lower IC coils peak
downward and upward within a very short time frame, leading to a similarly
fast reaction of the loads on points 4 to 6 of the TF coil. This is caused by
the movement of the plasma outward, downward and then inward, while it
carries a current close to its maximum. Such a reaction is not observed for
stationary or horizontal disruptions where the loads along the TF coil increase
immediately after fault initiation. However, the reaction of the IC coils is still
highly important for the load dynamics in these cases. As an example, the IC
coil currents for cases 0 and R1, i.e. when no coil is faulted but with and
without a stationary disruption, are shown in Fig. 3-13.
Without a disruption the plasma current is reduced slowly enough to drive
the IC coil current immediately to negative currents until EOPC, when they are
ramped up again until they decay after the end of the pulse. When a
stationary disruption occurs, the fast decay of the plasma current first leads to a
strong change in the magnetic field. However, the IC coils then try to
counteract this change, and high positive currents in the IC coils are induced.
The effect of the driven external PF coil currents seems to be negligible during
this phase. Finally, when the plasma current has decayed, the IC coils are
driven to negative currents by the external PF coils, similar to the case without
disruption, but now at a higher rate of change and to higher negative currents.
This behavior explains the dominance of the effect of the plasma disruption
during the first 0.5s after fault initiation and the somewhat increased loads along
the TF coil, and particularly at points 4 to 6. Otherwise, the differences in the
fast changes of the IC coil currents for the different disruptions are too small to
have significant impact on the load conditions for the PF coils.
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Current Scenarios of the Internal PF Coils with and without
Disruption when no Coil is Faulted; Solid Lines: No Disruption;
Dashed Lines: Stationary Disruption
3.4.2.5 Effect of Potential Mitigating Actions
The effect of a fast current rampdown within is of fault detection when the
fault is detected 2s after fault initiation is examined in cases 3a and 5a, i.e., for
shorts of coils PF1 or PF4.
In both cases, the forces on the external PF coils can be reduced rapidly
after initiation of the mitigating action, and the multiplication factors may be
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2.5 3.6 3.5 4.8 4.5 s.6
t me (sec)
Effect of Fast Current Rampdown
(Cases 3 and 3a)
equal or, for most loads on the external PF
detection.
after Detection of a Coil Fault
coils, less than without fault
The same result is obtained when PF4 is shorted and the proposed
mitigating action is taken. However, in case 3a, where a fault of PF1 is
examined, the force on the TF coils may be locally increased by an additional
factor of 2.3, and the maximum load on the TF coil is reached when the coil
currents in the unfaulted coils are ramped down. This is illustrated in Fig.
3-14.
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This timing may be caused by the IC coils. The out-of-plane loads on the
TF coil are determined by the magnetic field at the TF coil, and the IC coils
have a strong impact on the magnetic field at the inner corner of the TF coils.
Since it is assumed that the IC coils axe passive, the currents in the IC coils are
induced by changes in the magnetic field. The fast current rampdown after fault
detection obviously leads to such a fast change in the magnetic field that the IC
coil currents are ramped up, and contribute to the higher loads at the inner
corner of the TF coil. It may be that the main contributor to this field change
at the IC coils is coil PF4, since the load enhancement is not observed when
PF4 is faulted in case 5a.
3.4.2.6 The Impact of the Terminal Constraints on the Internal PF Coils
In this section, the impact of the assumptions made for the terminal
constraints and initial currents of the IC coils is evaluated. The importance of
the IC coil currents on the loads for the TF coils has already been discussed in
previous sections. This strong impact is a direct consequence of the design
objectives for the IC coils, which require that the IC coils allow for fast changes
of the magnetic field in the plasma area.
An example of how strongly the IC coils contribute to the magnetic field at
the TF coils is given in Table 3-8. Without any coil being faulted (case 0), the
IC coils contribute about three quarters of the vertical magnetic field at TF coil
point 1 at EOPC, and almost half of the radial magnetic field at point 7 about
is after EOPC. This is significantly more than the contribution from the
external PF coils or from the remaining structural elements. Obviously, this
explains the dominant impact of the IC coil currents on the out-of-plane loads
on the TF coil.
For all the scenarios discussed so far, it has been assumed that the IC coils
are shorted, i.e., completely passive. This assumption is justified as a first
approximation since the IC coil current scenarios are not well defined at the
present time. However, the IC coils may not be completely passive, i.e., there
may be diodes, etc., in the circuit that lead to some terminal constraints. The
high transient eddy currents of up to 1.2MA observed in the simulations must be
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considered in the design of these coils, which are sized to sustain currents around
0.5MA. On the other side, high voltages at the IC coil terminals may be
required to control the observed current peaks which follow disruptions.
A reference scenario (case R2) is simulated where no coil is faulted, no
disruption occurs, but all IC coil currents are zero at all times. This is another
limit case in that it assumes total control of the IC coil current. It is found
that the load scenarios for the external PF coils are essentially unchanged when
compared to the case with the IC coils being passive (case 0). This is due to
the distant location of the external PF coils from the IC coils. The same is
true for the loads on the TF coil along its inner and outer leg. But at TF coil
points 4 to 8, the load scenarios change significantly, and the maximum loads at
points 5 and 6 are considerably larger than when the IC coils are shorted. This
is illustrated in Fig. 3-15, and the enhancement factors for the maximum loads
are 2.5 and 3.5 for points 5 and 6 when compared to case 0. Thus, the loads
at the inner corner of the TF coil may even increase when the currents in the
IC coils are controlled. This could be attributed to a lack of opposition to fast
changes in the magnetic field which is usually provided by the IC coils.
Another issue related to the IC coils is concerned with the initial currents
in the IC coils and structural elements at the beginning of fault initiation. All
scenarios starting at EOFT are started with zero initial currents in the IC coils.
Simulations of faults initiated at EOPC start with initial currents obtained at
EOPC in case 0, i.e., under normal operating conditions when started with zero
initial IC coil currents at EOFT. This arrangement is chosen since it can be
expected that the eddy currents in the structural elements have died out at the
EOFT, since few changes in the external PF coils are imposed during the plasma
current flattop, as illustrated in Fig. 3-8. For the IC coils, similar arguments
can be made, but clearly with less certainty. Reference scenario R3, which
assumes passive IC coils and zero initial currents at the beginning of pulse
(BOP) demonstrates that the loads at EOFT on the PF and TF coils may be
quite different from the case where the initial currents in the IC coils and
structural elements are zero at EOFT. For coil PF4, and at the inner corner of
the TF coil, the loads at EOFT are higher by factors of up to 2 for the
scenario starting at BOP compared to the scenario starting at EOFT. But the
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maximum absolute forces observed in case R3 are higher as well, by factors of
1.5 to 5 for coils PF2 to PF4 and at the TF coil points 5 and 6. This example
illustrates that the load condition of the PF and TF coils are very sensitive to
the initial conditions for the IC coil currents and thereby the terminal
constraints on the IC coils.
Reference case R5 evaluates the effect of the initial currents for scenarios
started at EOPC. The same fault scenario as in case 16 is adopted, but now
all initial currents except for the external PF coils are set to zero. It is found,
that the load conditions at the inner corner of the TF coil and for coil PF4 are
again more severe, with additional enhancement factors of 3 to 5.
In summary, the terminal constraints on the IC coils are very important for
the load conditions which develop under fault and under normal operating
conditions. In particular the loads at the inner corner of the TF coil, points 4
and 5, and on coil PF4 may be increased when the IC coils are controlled rather
than passive. These loads also depend on the initial conditions at fault
initiation.
3.5 Comparison of the Loads on CIT and NET
A number of similarities between CIT and NET have already been
mentioned in previous chapters. Both machines are experimental tokamak
devices which are expected to achieve operation in the ignited plasma regime.
However, the size of both machines and their magnet technology differs
significantly. CIT is a machine with a major radius of 2.1 m and features
resistive coils, while the major radius of the NET machine may be almost 6m
and all magnets are superconducting except the internal PF coils [Salpietro 1988].
There is no unique scaling factor for the sizes of these machines, but the
dimensions of NET are radially larger by about 2.4 and axially larger by about
2.55. Table 3-9 gives an overview of the major parameters of the magnet
systems of both machines.
Both devices have D-shaped TF coils and a similar arrangement of the PF
coils, with internal and external PF coils. The current NET design calls for
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NET* CIT"
plasma current (MA) 11 15 11
peak out-of-plane force (MN/m) 16 20 8
net out-of-plane force
on half TF coil (MN) 75 75 8
overturning moment
on half TF coil (MNm) 40 28.5 16
torque
on half TF coil (MNm) na na 8
na: not available
*: NET data from [Salpietro 1988]
": CIT data from case 0
Fig. 3-10. Comparison of the Out-of-Plane Loads on the TF Coils for CIT
and NET under Normal Operating Conditions
only one pair of internal PF coils and possibly a second redundant internal coil
pair, while CIT currently features 3 pairs of internal PF coils. These internal
coils must provide the fast feedback control of the plasma in both designs. The
slow preprogrammed control is performed by the external PF coils, where NET
and CIT have a stack of central solenoid coils and outer PF coils. However,
NET features only two outer coils, P3 and P4, compared to four outer coils,
PF4 to PF7, at CIT.
When an average scaling factor of 2.5 is used, it is found that the NET
coils P3 and P4 are approximately at the same relative location to the central
solenoid coils and the TF coil as the coils PF4 and PF7 of CIT.
Some data on the out-of-plane loads on the TF coils exist for NET
{Salpietro 1988] and are compared with the loads found in this study under
normal operating conditions (case 0) in Table 3-10. This table illustrates that
there exists no linear relationship between the scaling factors for the machine
dimensions and the loads on the TF coil. The net out-of-plane force found in
the simulations for CIT is only about one tenth of that for NET, while the peak
out-of-plane forces and the overturning moment are almost half the value given
for NET.
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In principle, the results of the consequence analysis for CIT in this study
should be transferable to other machines like NET. However, further studies are
needed to establish a relation between the scaling factors for the machine size
and those for the dynamics and magnitudes of the load multiplication factors.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Highly reliable, safe and cost-efficient magnet systems will be required to
achieve the desirable availability, safety and cost goals for future fusion devices.
It is therefore important to ensure the reliability, reduce the risk, and enhance
the design of magnet systems. A failure and fault consequence analysis of
magnet systems can contribute to these goals to a high degree. So far, such
failure analysis has primarily been performed for Toroidal Field (TF) magnet
systems. The Poloidal Field (PF) magnet system has been considered to have
similar properties as the TF system. One reason for this is that only little
published data about the analysis of PF coil faults exists, and the database of
fault consequences is not well developed for the PF magnets.
The first part of this study examines the failure modes of the entire magnet
system and identifies the essential differences between the TF and PF magnet
systems. In particular, the pulsed operation and the diverse operational tasks of
the PF magnet system can lead to a number of interactions with other reactor
subsystems and need particular attention. As an example, a large number of
basic failure modes of the TF magnet system are connected to interactions with
the PF magnets. One important group of failures which may contribute highly
to those interactions, are electrical failures of the PF magnet system. The
second part of this study therefore investigates the consequences for the PF and
TF coils resulting from two basic categories of electrical failures of the PF
magnet system.
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4.1 Summary
4.1.1 Breakdown of a Magnet System
The functional breakdown of the magnet system is a first step in the
analysis of failure modes and the development of fault trees. Thus, the choice of
the subsystem boundaries of the magnet system is important for the clarity of
the following failure analysis, since an appropriate choice may simplify the
tracking of failure modes and interactions significantly. In this study, the
magnet system is first broken down into the TF and PF magnet systems, since
these systems have entirely different operation modes. The interactions between
these systems are then considered in a separate interaction analysis. While the
TF magnet system contains multiple coils of the same design, the PF magnet
system comprises two different coil systems. These systems are the external and
internal coil system, in which each coil is of the same type but not exactly of
the same design. Furthermore, each coil contributes to the multiple functions of
the coil system. Besides the coil systems, each magnet system also includes a
coil cooling system, a power supply system, and a protection and control system.
It is found that the boundaries of the coil cooling system and the protection and
control system are most difficult to draw when it is desired to keep the number
of interactions across system boundaries small. In general, systems like the plant
cryogenic cooling system or the external TF coils power supply system, whose
design has little implications for the design of the magnet system ought to be
excluded from the analysis of the magnet system. However, the external PF
power supply system may be highly important for the design of the PF magnets
and need to be examined.
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4.1.2 Failure Analysis of Magnet Systems
The analytical method used in this study to derive the failure modes is fault
tree analysis. Fault tree analysis is now a widely accepted tool for failure mode
analysis. Fault trees allow visualizing the failure logic of a system and are
thereby a powerful communication tool.
The functional breakdown of the magnet system can directly guide the
development of fault trees for each magnet subsystem. It is found that the fault
trees contain mostly OR-gates at the higher levels of failures. At lower levels,
a number of failures are caused by continuous combinations of multiple variables.
Often, such failures involve cyclic mechanical loadings of equipment under severe
environmental conditions, i.e., magnetic fields, thermal gradients or irradiation.
In general, the environmental conditions are also of high importance for a
large number of failures of the instrumentation and signal processing. Similarly,
the quality of manufacturing and assembly may have a large impact on the
reliability, in particular for superconducting coils, due to the seasitivity of
superconducting material to mechanical impacts. Furthermore, a number of
failures may be caused by inadequate cooling of equipment, so that either passive
cooling should be used wherever applicable or deformations of cooling lines and
their sensitivity to foreign materials need particular attention during the design.
In general, there exist broad similarities between the fault trees for the TF
and PF magnets, but some areas show significant differences. The main
differences in the failure analysis between the PF and TF magnet system stem
from the design of the central solenoid coil support structure, the internal PF
coils, and the power supply and control system.
The central solenoid coils need to be supported in radial and axial direction
by a structure which avoids contact with the central TF coil support structure
and whose radial dimensions are constrained by the size of the fusion device.
This also leads to constraints on the design of the current leads, which may in
turn increase the danger of shorts between coil terminals. The internal PF coils
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are subject to high mechanical and thermal loads and irradiation due to their
proximity to the plasma. However, if space permits, redundant coils can be
installed to allow for increased reliability. The PF power supply and control
system is significantly different from that of the TF system since each PF coil
needs to be provided with a different current scenario and the feedback control
of the plasma parameters is to be performed on a faster time scale. Therefore,
the potential for control and command failures, failures of protecting and
switching equipment, and of the external power supply system is greatly
increased for the PF power supply and control system when compared to the
respective TF systems.
In general, a number of failure modes of the TF magnet system is found to
be caused by interactions with the PF magnet system. Since these interactions
are not included in the failure mode analysis, they need to be examined in a
separate interaction analysis.
4.1.3 Interactions Analysis
The PF coil system is used for initiating and inducing the plasma current
and for controlling the position and shape of the plasma. This requires the
pulsed operation of the PF coils, where each coil will usually follow a different
current scenario.
The operational as well as the structural characteristics of the PF magnet
system can cause several types of interactions with other reactor subsystems.
Table 4-1 shows an interaction matrix for the PF magnet system which
describes the interactions caused by the four main PF magnet subsystems (in the
top row) to several reactor subsystems (in the left column). The table includes
the interactions that can occur during normal operation or under fault conditions.
Since most elements of the interaction matrix are occupied, the PF magnet
system is coupled with a large number of reactor subsystems. Most of the
coupling is due to the pulsed operation of the PF coils, and the strong reliance
on feedback information from the plasma which requires a large number of
control actions. The complex task of the PF magnet system also requires a
complex electrical system which can produce a large potential for fault initiation.
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Thus, a large number of interactions with other PF coils or reactor systems
can be triggered by failures in the electrical system of the PF magnets.
4.1.4 Electrical Failures of the PF Magnet System
The electrical and control system for the PF magnets needs to fulfill two
basic tasks: (1) to provide the predesigned voltages and currents at the coil
terminals; and (2) to allow for fast corrections of these voltages and currents
depending on the state of the plasma. In order to accomplish this task, designs
for devices like CIT or the Next European Torus (NET), include PF coils
external and internal to the TF coils. The external PF coils will be operated in
a slow control mode following preprogrammed current scenarios, while the
internal (IC) coils will allow for fast reaction based on plasma feedback control.
Since, at present, little information is available about the operating scenarios
for the IC coils, this work is focused on failures initiated in the electrical system
of the external PF coils. In general, each pair of external PF coils (above and
below the midplane) is likely to be powered independently by unidirectional
power supply modules. A switching network between each power supply and the
corresponding PF coil terminals is then required to obtain the designed output
voltages [Greenough 1987, Bertolini 1987]. The potential electrical failures of
such an electrical system can be grouped in two basic categories: (1) electrical
shorts of a coil pair or a single PF coil; and (2) erroneous control or switching
leading to undesired voltages at the coil terminals. For the study of specific
fault scenarios, the design of the CIT machine with a major radius of 2.1m
[Pillsbury 1988] is used. The two versions of an electromagnetic model of CIT
which are used in this study, are shown in Fig. 3-9. CIT has 7 pairs of external
PF coils, PF1 to PF7, and 3 pairs of IC coils, IC1 to IC3. All coils are
resistive and inertially cooled during a pulse, i.e., the Joule losses will lead to a
monotonic temperature rise. The maximum toroidal magnetic field at 2.1m is
11T and the maximum plasma current which is held for 5s, is 11MA. One
complete current pulse takes 28s, and the coils are cooled down to LN 2
temperature between pulses.
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The loads on the PF and the TF coils are examined for one type of fault
out of each basic failure category. These failures are shorts between external PF
coil terminals, or the application of a constant voltage at the terminals of
external PF coils. They are candidate cases for high loads on the PF and the
TF coils. The stresses and the temperatures in the external PF coils and the
effect of plasma reactions are then used as the main factors to decide upon the
time of fault initiation. The coil stresses are particularly large during the
plasma initiation phase and at the end of the plasma current flattop (EOFT).
The coil temperatures are rising during a pulse, so that a fault initiated during
the last phase of a pulse is more likely to lead to temperature problems than
when it is initiated earlier. Also, any major disturbance of the PF coil currents
is likely to be followed by a plasma disruption. Thus, it can be expected that
the higher the plasma current at fault initiation, the more severe will be the
loads on the PF and the TF coils caused by the plasma disruption. Therefore,
faults starting at EOFT and at the end of the plasma current (EOPC) are
investigated, where three types of plasma disruptions are considered: (1) a
stationary disruption, where the plasma current decays from 11MA to zero within
1rms; (2) a horizontal disruption, occurring within 5ms; and (3) a vertical
plasma disruption, where the plasma current is reduced to zero within 210ms. A
total of 24 scenarios have been investigated, and are shown in Table 3-3.
4.1.5 Model and Simulation Method
Two versions of an axisymmetric model of CIT are used for simulating the
fault scenarios and are illustrated in Fig. 3-9. Both models contain a
representation of the external and internal PF coils, the support structure for the
PF and the TF coils, and the vacuum vessel. Each element is assumed to be
toroidally continuous. The plasma is modeled as a current filament whose
position can be varied. The TF coil is approximated by a set of straight line
connections between 14 points for each half of the TF coil.
The currents in each of the elements are obtained by solving the lumped
parameter circuit loop voltage equations. From the resulting current scenario,
the radial and vertical forces on the external PF coils, the out-of-plane loads
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(i.e., normal to the cross section shown in Fig. 3-9) on the TF coil, and the
temperature scenario in the external PF coils are computed. The unfaulted coils
are driven with their preprogrammed currents, assuming that the currents rather
than the voltages will be controlled. The initial currents at EOFT in all passive
elements and the IC coils are zero for all scenarios but the plasma and the
external PF coils have initial currents corresponding to the preprogrammed
current scenario. The IC coils are modeled to be shortcircuited and not
connected in series above and below the midplane.
4.1.6 Simulation Results
For CIT, a degradation in the shear strength of the coil insulation may
occur for temperatures higher than 330K, which is adopted as the limit
temperature in the external coils. This temperature is not reached in any
external coil for faults involving shorted coils. In cases where coils are driven
with constant voltages, this temperature will be exceeded in any case since
adiabatic heating of the coils can be assumed. However, it takes a minimum of
4s after fault initiation to reach 330K for the considered range of scenarios.
This implies that temperature problems can be avoided when protective actions
are taken within 4s or less from the time of fault initiation.
The loads on the PF and the TF coils are evaluated by considering
multiplication factors which are obtained by dividing the maximum values for
each force under a fault condition by the corresponding maximum values under
normal operating condition when started at the EOFT. Assuming that a safety
margin of 2 would be implemented in the design, multiplication factors between
zero and two would define an envelope of allowable forces and moments.
Figures 4-1 and 4-2 show the multiplication factors of all scenarios except
for cases 13 and 15, where either PF4 or PF7 is driven with its full available
voltage. The forces were only traced until the temperature in one of the
external PF coils exceeds 330K. Fig. 4-1 shows that most multiplication factors
for the PF coils lie within a range of 1 to 2.2. Only the vertical force on PF7
reaches a factor of 4, but this occurs only when PF7 itself is driven continuously
with its voltage at EOFT for more than 5s without protective action. In all
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Maximum Multiplication Factors
of Forces on PF Coils
I
-- radial force
vertical force
- '<7 allowable envelope
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Fig. 4-1. Maximum Load Multiplication
1 to 17 (Except Cases 13 and
Factors for
15)
the PF Coils for Cases
other cases, the factors are below 2.5. Thus, shorts in general, and most of the
fault scenarios with constant coil voltages, pose little threat to the PF magnets
for the examined range of scenarios.
A similar result is obtained for the out-of-plane loads along the inner and
outer leg of the TF coil (points 2 to 4 and 7 to 13), as shown in Fig. 4-2.
High multiplication factors of up to 4.4 are obtained only at the inner corner of
the TF coil (points 5 and 6). This tendency of high multiplication factors at
the inner corner of the TF coil is found for almost all the examined fault
scenarios, and is particularly strong when coils PF4 or PF7 are faulted. The
terminal constraints on the IC coils are also important for the loads at the inner
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corner of the TF coil. Simulations with controlled IC coil current (i.e., the IC
coils carry no current during the pulse) yield forces higher by a factor of 2 to 4
at the inner corner of the TF coil when compared to a circuit with passive IC
coils. Clearly, the IC coils will be used to control plasma parameters and
cannot be completely passive as assumed in this study, but it is also
questionable whether the control voltage will be sufficient to control eddy
currents of up to 1.2MA in the IC coils. Thus, a detailed examination of the
design of the IC coils and their controls will be important for the out-of-plane
loads on the TF coils. The type of plasma disruption is generally found to be
of little importance for the loads on the PF coils, and has only local effects on
the force distribution along the TF coil.
When one of the coils PF4 or PF7 is driven with its full available voltage,
the load conditions for the PF and the TF coils become most severe. High
multiplication factors on the driven coil and at the inner corner of the TF coil
may be obtained within 2s from the time of fault initiation. Thus, in these
cases, fast detection and protective action is required to prevent a severe load
increase.
4.2 Conclusions and Recommendations
This study has shown that a failure mode analysis of the magnet system is
a very useful tool for the designer because it helps to identify areas of
uncertainty. The failure analysis of the magnet system shows that a large
number of failure modes of the magnet system involve fatigue and irradiation
effects. A future lifetime or reliability analysis may, therefore, need to include
time dependent failure rates to describe the failure behavior appropriately.
Furthermore, several failures in the magnet system can be caused by continuous
combinations of multiple variables, like the combined effect of irradiation, cyclical
loading and low temperatures. Work is needed to establish the boundaries
between allowable and failure conditions as a function of such variables which
may then be useful as input for a quantitative risk and reliability analysis of
magnet systems.
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Maximum Multiplication Factors
of Out-of-plane Forces on TF Colils
- force distribution
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Fig. 4-2. Maximum Multiplication Factors for the Out-of-Plane Loads on
the TF Coils for Cases 1 to 17 (Except Cases 13 and 15)
It is furthermore concluded that magnet systems may also have a significant
potential for burn-in failures and for human errors stemming from manufacturing,
assembly and from the initial setup of the protection and control logic.
Therefore, the components of a magnet system should be tested extensively prior
to their final installation in the fusion device. Furthermore, a number of failure
modes may arise from failures of instrumentation or control equipment in the
magnet system. Hence, the control decision logic, the repair logic and the
maintenance schedule may have a strong impact on the reliability of the entire
magnet system. The overall complexity of control and protection systems should
therefore be examined carefully to reduce the potential for fault initiation in
these systems, which could even overshadow failures of the protected or
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controlled equipment. This is of particular importance for the PF magnet
system since its characteristic operation requires many control and protection
functions. This work has shown that such failures may lead to a variety of
consequences in other reactor subsystems due to the large potential for
interactions with other systems caused by the PF magnet system. Since a large
number of those interactions can be triggered by electrical failures of the PF
magnets, it is concluded that the electrical and control system for the PF
magnets needs particular attention.
The application of model based fault tree generation techniques like the
Logic Flowgraph Methodology (LFM) [Guarro 1985] should also be explored. An
attempt during this study to use LFM for modeling the electrical and control
system of the PF magnets has shown that two essential problems would have to
be resolved in future studies in order to make use of the power of such
techniques to model the complex physical processes and control structures often
embedded in the design of magnet systems. The first problem involves the
generic representation of complex physical processes, like the control of plasma
parameters, so that the effect of deviations and the magnitude and direction of
corrective actions can be traced for each path in the system. A second problem
that needs to be addressed would be how to minimize the number of exogeneous
inputs in the modeled system, i.e., how to incorporate basic failures as direct
consequences of the operation of the system.
An analysis of the consequences of two types of electrical failures in the PF
magnet system, shorts between the terminals of external PF coils, and faults
where a constant voltage is applied at external PF coil terminals, reveals that
shorts pose little threats to the external PF coils. Also, the type of plasma
disruption following a fault is found to be of little importance in these cases.
Furthermore, a modestly fast protection system, e.g., capable of reacting within
4s or less from fault initiation for CIT, seems to be sufficient to handle most
faults. Only selected faults, involving the coils PF4 and PF7 for CIT, are found
to require faster protective action, e.g., within 2s or less for CIT, to avoid high
loads on the TF and PF coils.
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Additionally, some items require attention. The loads at the inner corner of
the TF coils can be substantially increased for a broad range of fault conditions.
This effect can be even stronger depending on the terminal constraints on the
internal PF coils. Even when mitigating actions are taken on detection of a
fault, increases in the loads at the inner corner of the TF coil could be obtained
under selected conditions.
As an extension to the consequence analysis in this work, future studies
could explore the applicability of sensitivity analysis techniques for the selection
of fault scenarios. Another aspect requiring attention in future work is the
strong impact of the current scenarios of the internal PF coils on the loads on
the TF coils. A future investigation of the effects of a broad range of IC coil
current scenarios could yield an envelope of allowable IC coil currents. Such an
analysis can then contribute to the design of the IC coils and their operating
scenarios and to the search for appropriate mitigating actions. These actions are
needed to allow for quickly reducing the loads on the external PF coils while
controlling the load distributions along the TF coil. This might also provide
robust reaction scenarios which contribute to an improved reliability of uhe
magnet system.
Approximate scaling factors for the radial and axial dimensions are provided
for CIT and NET by this study. Such scaling factors could be used as the
basis for the investigation of scaling laws for the load dynamics and the
magnitudes of the multiplication factors. Scaling laws would be particularly
useful since several designs for major future experimental machines like CIT,
NET and ITER may comprise similar coil arrangements but may have
substantially different machine dimensions.
In summary, the potential for failures with high consequences for the PF
and TF coils seems to be small for the examined class of failures. However,
when the protection system fails, faults with voltage driven coils may cause
severe consequences. Future work is needed to establish the impact of these
effects on the overall reliability and availability of the magnet system and the
plant. The final goal of such a failure and consequence analysis should be to
develop a framework for reliability allocation which incorporates safety and cost
considerations.
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Appendix A
FAULT TREE SYMBOLS
Fault tree analysis is nowadays widely used for qualitative and qualitative reliabil-
ity analysis and as the basis for risk assessment (see, for example [NRC 1975]). One of
the main reasons for the use of fault trees is that they are a communication tool which
shows how a sequence of failures can lead to a single top event. The failure logic is
visualized by a tree structure whose building blocks are gate and event symbols. Each
gate can have several inputs but only a single output, where each input or output is
a single failure event in the system. A variety of symbols for the representation of
different types of events and logical connections have been developed, and the symbols
used in this study are described in Table A-1. For a more detailed discussion of fault
tree symbols and fault tree analysis see for example [Henley 1981].
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FAULT TREE SYMBOLS
Symbol Gate Name Causal Relation
AND Gate output event occurs if all inputevents occur simultaneously
output event occurs if any input
OR Gate event occurs
output event occurs if any
Conditional continuous combination of
AND Gate input variables exceeds a limit
,condition [Siu 1988]
Symbol Event Description
circle: basic event with sufficient data, which
need not be broken down further
diamond: basic event which needs to be
broken down further but cannot because of
insufficient data (undeveloped event)
triangle: transfer symbol where fault tree is
continued with this event as new top event
Table A-1. Explanation of Fault Tree Symbols
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Appendix B
PF COIL OPERATION SCENARIOS FOR CIT
This appendix provides data for the operation scenario of the external PF coils of
CIT [Pillsbury 1988] which has been used during the selection of the types of faults
to be examined for each external PF coil and the time of fault initiation. Fig. B-1
provides the temperatures in the external PF coils under normal operating conditions.
Table B-1 presents the voltage per turn scenario for CIT, Fig. B-2 the axial and radial
(hoop) stresses in the external PF coils under normal operating conditions.
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Appendix C
DISRUPTION SCENARIOS
Three different types of disruptions have been examined in this study. For the
first type of disruption, it has been assumed that the plasma is stationary at the major
radius of the machine while the plasma current decays from initially 11MA to zero
within 11s. The data for the remaining disruption scenarios was obtained from runs
of the Tokamak Simulation Code (TSC), which uses an electromagnetic model of CIT
with a much finer element grid in the plasma region and for the vacuum vessel than
the model used in this study. It can therefore be used for disruption analysis, and two
sets of disruption data obtained from the TSC model, for a radial or horizontal and
a vertical disruptiont, are used in this study. This data has been used to compute
which plasma elements needed to be switched on and off to simulate the movement
of a current carrying plasma during the disruption. The plasma current scenarios and
the trajectories for the center of the plasma current that have finally been used in the
simulations are shown in Fig. C-1 and C-2.
t The data has been obtained from R.O. Sayer at the Fusion Engineering Design Center (internal
reference FEDC-L-88-PE-0351, 1988).
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Appendix D
SIMULATION MODEL
D.1 Comutation of the PF and Coil Loads
This appendix provides the methods that are used to simulate the fault
scenarios using of the electromagnetic model of CIT shown in Fig. 3-9. The
toroidally continuous elements in this model represent a set of inductively
coupled elements, where each element can carry a current in toroidal direction.
Given a set of of initial element currents and a vector of forcing voltages _(t),
the current scenario for all elements can be obtained by solving the linear matrix
differential equation
L + R1 = U (D.1)
where (t) is the vector of currents and L and R are the inductance and
resistance matrices of the circuit.
The inductance matrix L contains the self- and mutual inductances for all
circuit elements and will be symmetric. The resistance matrix R is a diagonal
matrix whose elements are the resistances of the elements in the model. Both
matrices depend on the model geometry, the geometry of the elements, and the
resistivity of each circuit element. The resistivity is in turn a function of the
materials and the element temperature, and a higher resistivity will usually be
obtained for higher temperatures. For this study, the temperature dependence of
the resistivity of a single element during the pulse will be neglected, and the
resistivities of coils and structural elements are computed once for the
approximately highest temperature obtained under normal operating conditions
and hold constant during the computation of the current scenario. Table D-1
shows the assignment of element temperatures and resistivities used in this
study. Since each PF coil consists of conductor (copper), and structural and
insulating materials, the effective resistivity peff of a PF coil is computed by
Peff = Pc"( Ti (D.2)ACU
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where Acu is the fraction of copper in the coil and Pcu(T) is the resistivity of
the copper at the adopted maximum temperature T. The inductance and
resistance matrices for both models are then obtained under use of the program
package SOLDESIGN.t
Once the inductance and resistance matrices are obtained the circuit
equation D.1 can be solved. Assuming that the forcing function f is constant,
the current vector 1(t) can be computed under use of an eigenexpansion
techniquet which yields a solution of the form
1(t) = Ls + vie X> (D.3)
where Is is the vector of steady state currents, n is the number of circuit
elements in the model, ri is the eigenvector i of the matrix L-1R, and Ai is the
eigenvalue corresponding to the eigenvector vi.
The vector of steady state currents Iss is determined by the driving voltages
Edriv and induced voltages find, to
Iss = R-1(find + Edriv) (DA)
The vector of driving voltages Edriv includes the driving voltages of all
circuit elements that are voltage driven and zeros for all other elements, while
the vector of induced voltages Hind is obtained form the current driven circuits
by
find = LQdriv (D.5)
where Idriv includes the driving currents for all current driven elements and
zeros for all other elements. Obviously, in order to fulfill the initial assumption
of a constant forcing function H(t), the driving voltages need to be constant or
the driving current functions need to be linear functions so that 1driv will be
constant.
t SOLDESIGN is a program developed by R.D. Pillsbury, Jr. and is currently available on the
MIT Plasma Fusion Center VAX and the MFE computer network.
1 The program NEWEIGEN used in this study uses such an eigenexpansion technique and has
been developed by R.D. Pillsbury, Jr. NEWEIGEN is currently available on the MIT Plasma
Fusion Center VAX and under the name EIGENCIRC on the MFE computer network.
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Then, the differential equation system from eq. D.1 can be rewritten:
L i+ R(I - L,,)= 0 (D.6)
and can be solved with
I(to)=10  (D.7)
being the vector of initial currents. This eigenexpansion technique can also be used for
piecewise constant driving voltages and piecewise linear driving current ramps when
the currents are tracked and the initial currents and time are reset after each time
interval.
Once the -current vector 1(t) is computed the forces on the toroidally continuous
elements and the TF coil can be obtained. Each current Ii in a single circuit element
j will contribute to the magnetic field Bi at a point i in the r-z-plane (which has only
components in radial and vertical direction since all elements carry toroidal currents,
see Fig. 3-9), so that
B. = >§, Ij (D.8)
j=1
where n is the number of circuit elements and bij is a vector of field influence coefficients
from element j to point i with components in radial and axial direction. These field
influence coefficients are only a function of the model geometry and are thus constant
for a given model.
The forces on a toroidally continuous element carrying a current Ii are then ob-
tained from the crossproduct of its current with the magnetic field B;. Since the current
Ii is always perpendicular to the magnetic field in the r-z-plane, the radial and axial
forces per unit circumferential length are obtained from
F. = I B
= I hij Ij (D.9)
= ij I I,
i=1
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When the forces on an element with radial and axial extension are to be calculated,
like for all the elements in the CIT model, a similar procedure can be used but the
forces need to be integrated over the entire cross section of the element. Similar to eq.
D.9, the total force on this element can then be obtained from
n
_Fi = I I (D. 10)
i= 1
where k1i now defines force influence coefficients for this element. These coefficients
depend only on the model geometry. The force influence coefficients for each toroidally
continuous element and the field influence coefficients for each point of the TF coil can
also be obtained under use of the program package SOLDESIGN.
The out-of-plane loads at each point of the TF coil can be computed from eq. D.9
under use of the field influence coefficients. Since the TF coil current lies in the same
plane as the magnetic field, the force qi (per unit circumferential length) on the TF coil
perpendicular to the r-z-plane (or out of the plane of the TF current) is determined by
qi = ITFdTFi x B. (D.11)
where ITF is the total TF coil current, dTFi defines the direction of the TF coil current
at point i, and B is the magnetic field at point i from the toroidally continuous elements
of the model. In this study, the direction of the TF coil current at a point i of the
TF coil is approximated by the slope of the straight line connection between the two
adjacent points i - 1 and i + 1.
The net out-of-plane force on a TF coil half is obtained by integrating the force
per unit length qi along the TF coil. Approximating the force distribution q(r) along
the TF coil by linear functions between two points i and i + 1 yields for a single coil
segment
q(r) = qi (r - ri) + i (D.12)
Ari
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for r between ri and ri+1. The TF coil is approximated by straight line connections,
so that the running length of the connection between points i and i + 1 is given by
li = ((r - ri)2 + (z - zi)2)0-s (D.13)
and
z(r) = z; + (r - ri)Ari
with Ari = ri+1 - r (D.14)
and Az = zi+1 - z
Similarly, the moment Mr about the radial axis or the overturning moment on a
half TF coil is obtained by
M-1 Ali
M,. = E fq(r) z(r) dli (D. 15)
i=10
where m is the number of points representing the TF coil and Ali is the distance
between points i and i + 1. Combining eq. D.15 with eq. D.12 and D.14 yields
M, = j 2 qi+ + qi + (qi+ + qi) Ali zi (D.16)
t=i
The moment M. about the vertical axis, or the torque, on a half TF coil can be
computed analogous to the overturning moment:
m-+
M,= 2 (i+1 +i Ari Ali+ (i+1 + i) Alir) (D.17)
-146-
Appendix D: SIMULATION MODEL
D.2 Computation of the 'Iemperature in TIbroidal Elements
The temperatures in a resistive coil can be estimated by use of the G-function when
the current scenario I(t) for the coil is known [Pillsbury 1988a]. Assuming adiabatic
heating of the coil, which is assumed for CIT [Thome 1988], the temperature rise in
the coil is given by
&Ty c,(T) - = p(T) j.. (D.18)
and T(to) = To, where y is the mass density of the coil, c,(T) is the temperature
dependent specific heat capacity, T is the coil temperature, pc.(T) the temperature
dependent resistivity of the conductor, and j, the current density in the conductor
(which is copper for CIT). Assuming furthermore that the current density in the con-
ductor is homogeneous, j, is given by
j-A (D.19)
where Acu is the cross sectional area of the conductor.
Since the coil may consist of conductor and structure, an average heat capacity
(7 c,(T))., needs to be used in eq. D.18. Since several external PF coils of CIT consist
of copper and St-718, whose mass fraction are fu and ft, where
f. + f~t =(D.20)
the average heat capacity of a coil is given by
(-y c,(T)).,, = feu 7yc C,. + es, fat Yt c,.t (D.21)
where et represents the effective fraction of steel contributing to thermal diffusion
which may be less than 1 due to a thermal diffusion lag in the coil.
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Combining eq. D.18, D.19, and D.21 then yields
,9T I2(t )(fcu tcu cp. + et fst yt c,,) c- p u(T) (D.22)
Integrating eq. D.22 from the initial time to and temperature To to the current time t
and temperature T gives
T T tJ7cu cp,(T) dT + et J 7,t cp,,(T) dT = 1 f 12 (t) dt (D.23)
pCU(T) fcu f pPt (T) A
To To to
The integrals on the left hand side can be computed and tabulated without prior
knowledge of the current scenario. These integrals are usually called G-functions, where
T
G = -e,, c,.u(T) dTI peu(T)
TO
and
T
G,= f Yt cp,(T) dTf p~t(T)
TO
so that
t
Geu(T) + eat f-t G5 t(T) = J 2 (t) dt (D.24)
to
Then, the temperature of the coils can be estimated by first computing the G-
function for the entire coil,
Gtot(T) = Gcu(T) + e,t -- Gt(T) (D.25)fcu
at the initial temperature To, and then again at each time step during the scenario by
t
Gtot(T) = Grt~(To) + 1 J (t) dt (D.26)
to
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Once the total G-value is known, the coil temperature T can be looked up in a table
for Gtt, obtained from eq. D.26.
In this study, it is assumed that there is no thermal diffusion lag in the coil, i.e.
e,t = 1
is used for all scenarios. The mass fractions for copper and St-718 used for the external
PF coils are provided in Table D-2, and it is assumed that copper with a mass density
of 8950kg/m 3 and St-718 with a mass density of 8100kg/m 3 are used. The specific
heat capacities c,. and c,,, of copper and St-718 are approximated by piecewise linear
functions of the temperature:
(D.27)
for T between T and Ti+. Similarly, the resistivities of copper and St-718 are approx-
imated by
p(T) = po(a+bT)
These relations are then used to compute the look up tables for G., and Gt.
Coil Packaging Factors
for copper fe, for St-718 ft
PF1 0.39- 0.39
PF2 0.39 0.39
PF3 0.39 0.39
PF4 0.8 0.0
PF5 0.8 0.0
PF6 0.8 0.0
PF7 0.8 0.0
Table D-2. Packaging Factors for the External PF Coils of CIT
(Data from [Pillsbury 1988])
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c,(T ) = acpi + bej (T - TO)
